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Summary
Aviation is one of the earliest application of the Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS). Since the early days of the Global Positioning System (GPS),
satellite navigation has been an essential part of the aviation industry. Being a
particular mean of transport which usually involves a large number of human lives,
civil aviation always requires a high level of reliability from the navigation system.
Such requirement brings about the concept of integrity, which concerns about the
consistency and reliability of a navigation system, is defined as the capability of the
system to provide timely warning when it should not be used for navigation. The
concept of integrity allows the standardization of guidance systems’ performance,
with the utmost purpose of keeping safety for every flight.
The concept of integrity has gained interests in other GNSS applications as well,
especially in those that also require high reliability from the navigation solution,
such as Intelligent Transport System (ITS), railways. This leads to the necessity to
adapt the integrity monitoring techniques, in particular the Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) algorithms, to use in working conditions other than
the typical airport areas, such as urban environment. As a matter of fact, adapta-
tion of RAIM algorithms to urban environment requires a throughout analysis of
the environmental difference of the working condition as well as the requirement of
the intended applications.
This thesis focuses on developing a Kalman filter-based Advanced RAIM (ARAIM)
algorithm for urban environment, which is an adaptation of the conventional ARAIM
algorithm for civil aviation. ARAIM algorithm is considered the next generation of
RAIM, aiming at providing higher integrity performance for more stringent phase
of flight. The first step is to survey the necessary changes to adapt ARAIM algo-
rithm to urban scenario. Experimental study highlight the prerequisite of finding a
iii
noise model to represents the signal noise level in urban area. After a suitable noise
model was found after a comparative study, the KF-based ARAIM algorithm was
developed. This method evaluates the separation of state correction using different
subsets of measurement to detect abnormalities as well as potential faulty satellites
for exclusion. The proposed method was also validated using simulation and real
data. Performance analysis results show that the proposed algorithm can effectively
follows the changes of signal quality which is expected to occur frequently when
moving in urban environment, confirming its suitability for integrity monitoring in
urban environment.
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Introduction
Navigation has been an essential technology of human life since the early ages
of history. Knowing one’s location as well as the direction to the destination, es-
pecially across open ocean. Throughout the history, many different techniques to
aid human in calculating one’s location and deriving direction have been devel-
oped, the latest of which is the GNSS. Combining the study from multiple fields
of technologies, GNSS has developed integrated itself into many other applications
and services. Starting with just one system, the Global Positioning System (GPS)
developed by the United States since the late 1970s, nowadays the world has seen
many other GNSSes come to view: the GLONASS, developed by Russia starting
from early 1980s, and the Galileo created by the European Union (EU) from 1999.
More satellites have been gradually launched for the developing systems, thus in-
creasing the operational capability as well as global coverage. On the other hand,
it is also worth mentioning other Regional Navigation Satellite Systems (RNSS),
which, as the name suggests, cover only certain areas, such as the Beidou from
China, QZSS from Japan, IRNSS from India. All these progressive appearance of
navigation satellite systems comes hand in hand with the development of many
other technologies that are also fundamental to today’s daily life: telecommunica-
tion, electronics, e-commerce, etc.
GNSS technology is closely linked with most form of transportation, one of
which is civil aviation. Being a particular form of transportation which involves a
large number of human lives, air safety has been an important issue throughout the
aviation history. As a result, the application of GNSS into civil aviation led to new
standard and requirement for GNSS performance to ensure reliability throughout
the flight. One of the most important concepts defined for reliability assurance is
GNSS Integrity. The integrity of a GNSS system is the capability of the system to
1
provide timely warnings to users when the system should not be used for naviga-
tion. Integrity concerns directly with the consistency and the reliability in term of
performance of the navigation system. In fact, integrity is one of four parameters
in evaluating the performance of a navigation system as defined by the Required
Navigation Performance (RNP) Navigation Specification - the other parameters
are: accuracy, availability and continuity.
Integrity monitoring service can be provided from different augmentation sys-
tems. The GBAS utilizes monitoring stations on the ground in airport area, then
broadcasts the integrity assessment information to aircrafts in approach. The
Satellite-based Augmentation System (SBAS), on the other hand, consists of a
larger network of ground stations over the area of a continent, and a constella-
tion of geostationary satellites to provide integrity assessment service over a large
area. The Aircraft-based Augmentation System (ABAS), however, relies only on
the navigation data from GNSS receivers and other equipments on-board for the lo-
cal integrity monitoring operation. As a result, ABAS algorithms, and particularly
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) allows operational integrity
monitoring everywhere, while GBAS and SBAS have only limited service coverage.
It is important to note that, RAIM was initially developed to provide integrity
monitoring service for Non Precision Approach (NPA), which is a landing proce-
dure that only provides lateral guidance and has low integrity requirement. Recent
works have led to the next generation of RAIM called ARAIM, which can provide
better integrity performance, aiming at more stringent phases of flight.
Although the integrity concept was created for civil aviation, it has gain in-
terests in other fields as well, especially navigation-based applications that also
require high level of reliability, such as Intelligent Transport System (ITS), road
tolling applications, and railways. This leads to a multitude of works in adapt-
ing previously aviation-made integrity monitoring algorithms, in particular, RAIM
algorithms due to its flexibility and autonomous nature, to a different working en-
vironment, which is urban area. However, the environmental differences between
airports and urban areas render it difficult for the adaptation. Notably, urban en-
vironment sees a higher level and more unpredictable multipath effect, due to the
presences of buildings and other physical obstacles. Besides, the integrity require-
ments for urban-based applications (which are usually not Safety of Life (SOL))
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should not be as strict as in aviation (which can be considered SOL application).
In fact, an ideal adaptation of RAIM and ARAIM algorithms to urban environ-
ment has to take into account all the differences, not only in term of environment
characteristics, but also the requirement of the intended applications.
Based on the analysis above, this thesis is dedicated to develop an adaptation
of ARAIM algorithm for integrity assessment in urban environment. The first
step of the work involves an in-depth study of the original ARAIM algorithm for
civil aviation. This combines with consideration with the differences between civil
aviation and urban environment application leads to a list of changes necessary for
the urban-based ARAIM. As a matter of fact, the underneath noise model of the
algorithm is the most important point of change, due to the much higher level of
noise encountered in urban context. The second step of the work surveys several
alternatives for the noise model. To assist the testing phase, a MATLAB-based
signal generator has been developed, which can specifically simulate the multipath
effect present in urban areas. The chosen noise model is based on the carrier-to-
noise ratio (C/N0), allows it to dynamically represents the signal quality in a way
that the original ARAIM’s model cannot. In the final step, the ARAIM algorithm
is adapted onto a KF model. The KF model was chosen due to its flexibility and
capability to integrate with other external sensors, thus allowing potential for future
extensions.
Thesis outline
The thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 1 presents the overview of the GNSS receiver architecture and brief
descriptions about the operation of underlying components. The Chapter also
explain about the principles for estimating Position, Velocity, Time (PVT).
• Chapter 2 describes the concept of GNSS other related concepts such as
integrity monitoring methods and integrity performance requirement. In par-
ticular, since the concept of integrity was designed for civil aviation, a section
is devoted to terminology related to performance assessment in civil aviation.
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• Chapter 3 discuss about the issues when adapting ARAIM algorithm from
aviation to urban environment. Experimental study in this Chapter solidifies
the necessity of a suitable noise model for urban use. A comparative study
leads to the selection of a model based on C/N0 ratio.
• Chapter 4 is dedicated to the development of the proposed KF-based ARAIM
algorithm, which is later validated using simulation and real data.
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Chapter 1
Overview of the GNSS receivers
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the technology of navigation is about
finding one’s location. The GNSS receiver is the device on the users’ end that
help answering the question about location, and actually showing it as the final
result. This Chapter is dedicated to the architecture, operation of GNSS receivers,
the PVT calculation process, as well as the error sources that may hinder the
operation of the receivers. These can be considered the technical foundation for
the discussion related to integrity monitoring in subsequent Chapters.
1.1 Receiver architecture
1.1.1 Basic receiver architecture and operation
In general, a GNSS receiver is an electronic device used to receive and process
the navigation signal from GNSS satellites to calculate the Position, Velocity, Time
of the receiver. Although there are multitude of processing algorithms to process
the navigation signal, the general architecture of a GNSS receiver is depicted in
Figure 1.1.
The first block of the process is the frontend. The main functions of the frontend
are to receive the navigation signal from the antenna, convert it from the naviga-
tion band (such as GPS L1 band at 1.57542 GHz [118]) to a lower Intermediate
Frequency (IF) and finally digitize the downconverted signal. A frontend for GNSS
receivers usually consists of [129]:
5
1 – Overview of the GNSS receivers
• A passive bandpass prefilter to filter out-of-band interferences.
• Local oscillators to aid the downconverting process to IF
• The Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) to digitizes the signal.
• The Automatic Gain Control (AGC)
Figure 1.1: Generic architecture of a GNSS receiver
Out of the frontend, the digitized signal is a combination of the SIS of all visible
satellites. For instance, the digitized signal of the ith can be written in mathematical
form as:
ri(nTs) =
√
2Pidi(nTs−τi)ci(nTs−τi) cos(2π(fIF +fD,i)nTs+φi)+nW (nTs) (1.1)
The terms are defined as follows:
• Ts is the sampling interval
• Pi is the received power of the signal
• di is the navigation data bits
• ci is the Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) spreading code
• fIF is the intermediate frequency
• fD,i is the Doppler frequency
• φi is the initial carrier phase
• τi is the code delay
6
1.1 – Receiver architecture
• nW is a discrete-time random process, which is the result of sampling the
noise at the frontend. nW can be assumed to be Gaussian with zero mean,
variance σ2W = N0BIF where N0 is the power of received noise, BIF is the
bandwidth of the frontend
Acquisition stage
After the fronend is the signal synchronization block, in which the received SIS
of each satellite is synchronized with the local replica signal. In this block, the sig-
nal is processed in multi-channel manner, each channel processes the signal of one
satellite. The first step of the process is the acquisition stage, which roughly esti-
mate several parameters of the digitized signal: the spreading code ci, the Doppler
frequency fD,i and code delay τi. For each PRN spreading code, the receiver will
generate a testing (discrete) signal with different values for fD,i and τi, then com-
pare this testing signal with the received one by calculating the cross-correlation
function. The search space is discrete to ensure low search time, as depict in Fig-
ure 1.2, with each crosspoint represents a testing signal. The search bin size is
determined as [129]:
∆fD,bin =
1
2Tcoh
(1.2)
∆τbin =
Fs
2Rc
(1.3)
where Tcoh is the length (in time) of the signals being used for cross-correlation
calculation; Rc is the spreading code rate, for GPS Rc = 1.023MHz; Fs is the
sampling frequency of the frontend. In other words, the acquisition stage can be
considered a process of tuning to find which satellites are broadcasting. Estimating
fD,i and τi for the broadcasting satellites is equivalent to finding a point in the
search space that is closest to the actual point corresponding to the received signal.
The most straight-forward method for acquisition stage is to run a serial search
in the search space. This method, although time consuming, is simple enough to
be implemented in hardward receiver. On the other hand, there are also parallel
search methods using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [129], which is more favorable
7
1 – Overview of the GNSS receivers
Figure 1.2: Seach space for the acquisition stage
for software-based receivers. Recent methods also propose the use of Sparse Fourier
Transform (SFT) [114, 107] or FFT decomposition [1] to improve execution time
of the acquisition stage.
Tracking stage
The tracking stage finely estimates the fD,i nd τi starting from the rough esti-
mation from the acquisition stage, as well as closely follows the changes of those
parameters along the received signal. There are two parallel process in the tracking
stage:
• Code tracking process is where the code phase is dynamically estimated. In
principle, this process tries to replicate the spreading code in the received
signal by creating 3 separate versions of the spreading code with 0.5 chip
delay each and cross correlate each version to the received signal. This exploits
the self-correlation properties of the spreading code, especially in the case of
GPS: the self-correlation value will decrease to 0 when the code is shifted
more than 1 chip-length. Figure 1.3 [22] demonstrates the use of 3 versions
of the code to determine the code delay to track GPS L1 signal. A Delay
8
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Locked Loop (DLL) will do the cross correlation calculation, calculate the
difference between the 3 versions of the code using a discrimination function,
then adjust the local spreading code generator accordingly.
As a side note, while the spreading code property mentioned above is very
straightforward for GPS L1 signal, the cases of Galileo signals on the other
hand are more complex. Galileo signals utilize the Binary offset carrier (BOC)
modulation, adding a sub-carrier of frequency equals or higher than the chip
rate. BOC modulation allows interoperability of many GNSS systems on the
same band without interference as well as more robust against multipath,
but at the same time makes the tracking process more complex due to a more
complicated self-correlation function and discrimination curve than the case
of GPS L1 (see Figure 1.4 [23]). The detailed tracking methods for such
signals are out of the scope of this thesis, interested readers can refer to [23,
38, 63] for more details.
• Carrier tracking process, on the other hand, aims at replicate the carrier of
the received signal by adjusting the local carrier frequency and phase. Carrier
tracking is also done by locked loops, calculating the cross correlation between
the carriers of the received signal and the locally generated signal, then adjust
accordingly. The carrier tracking process is usually executed in two steps: a
Frequency Locked Loop (FLL) will estimate the carrier frequency (in what is
called the pull-in phase) then a Phase Locked Loop (PLL) will finely estimate
the phase of the carrier.
A generic tracking scheme is presented in Figure 1.5. The input signal (from
the frontend) is multiplied with the local spreading code and local carrier generated
by the receiver for cross correlation calculation. The result is then passed through
the discriminator to evaluate the errors of fD,i nd τi as generated by the receiver.
The evaluated errors are used as feedback for local generators to adjust for the
next round. On the other hand, the discriminator output is also used to decide the
lock status of the PLL and DLL. When the locked loops are locked, the output of
the tracking process will be of square wave-like form, representing the navigation
data element in (1.1), which will be fed to the demodulation block to obtain the
navigation messages. In summary, the goal of the tracking process is to wipe off
9
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(a) Local code is too early and should be delayed
(b) Local code and received code are synchronized
Figure 1.3: Local code versions correlation with the received signal
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(a) GPS L1 C/A
(b) Galileo BOC(1,1)
Figure 1.4: Correlation function and early-minus-late discrimination curve of dif-
ferent signals
the spreading code and carrier, to recover the navigation data underneath.
PVT calculation
The next important block in the GNSS receiver is the PVT calculation block.
This purpose of this block is to calculate the position of receiver, as well as the
11
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Figure 1.5: Generic scheme for the tracking stage
velocity and time. In general, the process of PVT calculation involves the following
steps:
• The navigation data obtained from the tracking block is demodulated into
the navigation message, which contains the ephemeris, almanac as well as
correction data required to calculate the position of the satellites.
• With the code delay estimated also from the tracking block, the pseudoranges
between the satellites and the receivers are calculated using the transmission
time method mentioned before.
• Using the calculated satellites’ positions, pseudoranges and Doppler frequen-
cies (also from the tracking stage), the receiver’s position, velocity and time
can be calculated.
Detailed positioning algorithms will be described in Section 1.2.
1.1.2 Software receiver approach
Nowadays, most of the GNSS receivers in the market are hardware receiver,
where the signal synchronization process is executed using application-specific in-
tegrated circuit (ASIC). While allowing very high computation performance, hard-
ware receivers are not easy to be updated or replaced. This is not ideal, especially
when the GNSS environment is changing rapidly with many new satellite systems
12
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come into view. Therefore, the idea of Software-Defined Radio (SDR) approach
was adopted to GNSS receivers [24, 98], and has become a favorable approach es-
pecially for research purpose. In software receivers, the signal synchronization and
subsequent stages are implemented in software on computers or embedded systems
instead of hardware as before. This allows great flexibility to the solution [90, 102],
easy to reconfigure or update without arduously altering the hardware. Due to the
difference in nature between the two platforms, it is necessary to develop process-
ing algorithms suitable for software receivers to ensure manageable performance or
even real-time capability [73, 24]. In fact, software receiver has been an important
topic recently in the field of GNSS [105, 42, 40].
1.2 PVT schemes
The idea of the positioning process is based on a technique called trilateration.
In principle, it is possible for a receive to calculate the position knowing the geomet-
rical distance from its location to another three points, in this case three satellites.
In GNSS, the geometrical range can be estimated by measuring the signal trans-
mission time from the satellites to the receiver. Since the transmission velocity of
electromagnetic (EM) wave (in vacuum) is known to be equal the speed of light
c = 299792458 m/s, the distance can be computed by multiplying the transmission
time and the speed of light. However, it is important to note that, the transmission
medium is, in fact, not vacuum. The EM wave containing the signal is attenuated
when passing through the atmosphere, plus the thermal noise on both the satellites
and the receivers, potentially clock errors, leading to the computed distance is not
exactly the true geometrical range from the satellite to the receiver. The range
including other errors is called pseudorange.
With the pseudoranges obtained, the position of the receiver is the solution to
the following system of simultaneous equations:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρ1 =
√
(x1 − xu)2 + (y1 − yu)2 + (z1 − zu)2
ρ2 =
√
(x2 − xu)2 + (y2 − yu)2 + (z2 − zu)2
ρ3 =
√
(x3 − xu)2 + (y3 − yu)2 + (z3 − zu)2
(1.4)
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Figure 1.6: Trilateration technique using GNSS satellites
where xu, yu, zu are the coordinates of the receiver, which is also the unknown of
the system; (xi, yi, zi) with i = 1,2,3 are the coordinates of the satellites, which can
be computed using the navigation data broadcasted from the satellites, ρi are the
pseudoranges measured by the receiver. In fact, (1.4) can be interpret as finding
the intersection of 3 spheres in 3D space, the centers of which are the satellites.
Since there are 3 unknowns corresponding to the 3 coordinates of the receiver, it is
necessary to have at least 3 equations to solve.
In reality, in order to measure the transmission time between the satellites and
the receiver, the clocks on both sides have to be perfectly synchronized. In fact, this
is usually not the case, since the satellites’ clocks are typically very high quality,
while the receiver side clock is not. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce another
equation into (1.4) for the clock difference, due to which (1.4) becomes:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρ1 =
√
(x1 − xu)2 + (y1 − yu)2 + (z1 − zu)2 + cδtu
ρ2 =
√
(x2 − xu)2 + (y2 − yu)2 + (z2 − zu)2 + cδtu
ρ3 =
√
(x3 − xu)2 + (y3 − yu)2 + (z3 − zu)2 + cδtu
ρ4 =
√
(x4 − xu)2 + (y4 − yu)2 + (z4 − zu)2 + cδtu
(1.5)
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As thus, it is required at least 4 satellites (and 4 equations) to calculate the
position of a receiver.
Since (1.5) is a non-linear system of equations, linearizing this using Taylor
expansion will make it easier to solve [127]. As a result, the linearized form of a
ranging equation can be expressed as:
∆ρi =
xi − xˆu
ri
∆xu +
yi − yˆu
ri
∆yu +
zi − zˆu
ri
∆zu − c∆tu
= hx,i∆xu + hy,i∆yu + hz,i∆zu (1.6)
where uˆ = (xˆu, yˆu, zˆu, cδtu)T is the (known) linearization point; hˆi = (hx,i, hy,i, hz,i)
is a unitary vector pointing from the linearization point to the ith satellite; ∆u =
(∆xu,∆yu,∆zu,−c∆tu)T is the difference between the linearization point and the
true point; ri is the geometrical between the linearization point and the satellite.
From this, the linearized system of equations can be written in matrix form as
follows, in the case of Nsat satellites:
∆ρ = H¯∆u (1.7)
where ∆ρ ∈ RNsat is the vector contains the difference between the measured
pseudorange and the distance from the satellites to the linearization point; H¯ ∈
RNsat×4 is called the linearization matrix, and is given by:
H¯ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
hx,1 hy,1 hz,1 1
hx,2 hy,2 hz,2 1
hx,3 hy,3 hz,3 1
... ... ... ...
hˆx,Nsat hy,Nsat hz,Nsat 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(1.8)
In fact, it is also possible to define H¯ in East-North-Up (ENU) form, centering
at the linearization point. In this method, the row elements of H¯ can be defined
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as [135]:
hx,i = − cos(θi) sin(αi)
hy,i = − cos(θi) cos(αi)
hz,i = − sin(θi) (1.9)
This form of H¯ is useful when subsequent evaluation is considered in horizon-
tal/vertical plane around the receiver’s position. On the other hand, since the
measured pseudoranges are affected by many different errors encountered by the
signal when transmitting to the receiver (see Section 1.3), it is necessary to include
also the pseudorange errors in (1.7). Let ϵ ∈ RNsat be the vector containing the
pseudorange errors, the most generalized form of (1.7) can be written as:
∆ρ = H¯∆u+ ϵ (1.10)
In the end, with the linearization, the problem of calculating the solution be-
comes finding the correction ∆u from the linearization point to the true position,
which can be done by solving (1.9). There are several method for solving this: LS
method, KF, and more recently H-infinity (H∞). The LS method is considered a
classic approach [9], calculate iteratively the value of ∆u until the linearization
point converge to the potential true position. The KF method applies the Kalman
filter model [30] into solving the navigation equation, can produce the position in
only one iteration. The H∞, on the other hand, can be considered a special form
of KF but with different way to deal with the process noise [44]. H∞ is out of the
scope of this thesis, therefore interested readers can find more about H∞ in [44, 57].
1.2.1 Least square
The LS solution is the simplest method to estimate the position of the receiver
from the pseudoranges information. It is a memory-less approach in which the
receiver position vector uk is estimated at epoch tk using only the ρk pseudorange
vector derived at that same epoch. Recall relations binding uk and ρk is linearized
leading to a set of Nsat linear equations that can be expressed in matrix form at
epoch tk:
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∆ρk = H¯k∆uk + ϵk (1.11)
∆uk is then derived with the classical weighted least square formula [35]:
∆uˆk = (H¯TkΣ−1k H¯k)−1H¯TkΣ−1k ∆ρk (1.12)
in which Σk is the covariance matrix of ϵk.
Obviously this evaluation can be performed only if at least four satellites are in
sight so that Nsat ≥ 4. It should be remarked that, since the least square solution
is a memory-less approach depending only on measurements at time tk, it does not
perform any smoothing on the obtained PVT results which are in general quite
noisy.
1.2.2 Kalman filter
KF is widely applied in many engineering fields, it was developed in the 1960s
to recursively estimate the state vector of dynamic systems. In GNSS receivers,
KF is utilized in different ways, to integrate inertial sensors with the GNSS receiver
at different levels [41], or it is embedded in the tracking part of the receivers with
vector tracking loop architecture [119]. Commonly, the KF uses a state vector
containing the receiver position coordinates and clock bias along with corresponding
derivatives [30, 41]. In this work, the receiver is designed to work with GPS L1 and
Galileo E1b signal, therefore the state vector consists of 9 states as follows:
xk =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
uk
−c∆tGPS,k
−c∆tGal,k
u˙k
−c∆˙t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(1.13)
where uk ∈ R3 is the position coordinate vector (R represents the set of real
numbers); ∆tGPS and∆tGal is the difference between the receiver’s clock and system
time of GPS and Galileo, respectively; c is the speed of light; ∆˙t is the clock drift.
With Nsat being the total number of satellites, the notation used for the filter
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description at epoch tk is:
• xk ∈ R9 is the process state vector
• Φk ∈ R9×9 is the state transition matrix relating xk to xk+1
• wk ∈ R9 is the process noise vector, assumed to be a white sequence with
known covariance matrix Qk
• zk ∈ R2Nsat is the measurement vector containing the pseudorange and Doppler
measurement for each satellite.
• Hk ∈ R2Nsat×9 is the matrix giving the linear connection between the mea-
surement and the state vector
• vk ∈ R2Nsat is the measurement error vector, which is assumed white with
known covariance Rk and zero crosscorrelation with wk.
• Rk is the covariance matrix of vk, it is assumed to be diagonal and it is
derived according to the model in [70].
The linear connection matrix Hk is given by [31]:
Hk =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
hu,GPS 1Nsat×1 0Nsat×1 0Nsat×3 0Nsat×1
hu,Gal 0Nsat×1 1Nsat×1 0Nsat×3 0Nsat×1
0Nsat×3 0Nsat×1 0Nsat×1 hu,GPS 1Nsat×1
0Nsat×3 0Nsat×1 0Nsat×1 hu,Gal 1Nsat×1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (1.14)
where each row of hu ∈ RNsat×3 is the unit vector pointing from the linearization
point to the location of each satellite [30], in which hu,GPS and hu,Gal contain the
vectors corresponding to satellites of GPS and Galileo constellation, respectively.
In this thesis, the alternative form of Kalman filter[30] is used. The state co-
variance matrix Pk is calculated from the apriori covariance matrix P−k as:
P−1k =
(
P−k
)−1
+HTk R−1k Hk (1.15)
The apriori covariance matrix P−k can be propagated from the previous epoch:
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P−k = Φk−1Pk−1ΦTk−1 +Qk−1 (1.16)
Pk can be initialized by either assuming to be diagonal with large value [78], or
estimated using Least-square results of several initializing steps.
The Kalman Gain Kk is given by:
Kk = PkHTk R−1k (1.17)
The state estimate xˆk can be calculated from the predicted state vector x−k as:
xˆk = xˆ−k +Kk(zk −Hkxˆ−k−1) (1.18)
xˆ−k is propagated from the previous epoch by xˆ−k = Φkxˆ−k−1
Considering the definition of the state vector xk in (1.13), the state transition
matrix Φk is defined as:
Φk =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0 ∆t 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 ∆t 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ∆t 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ∆t
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ∆t
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(1.19)
in which ∆t is the time interval between epochs. In this work the position is
calculated every second, thus ∆t = 1 s.
The measurement error covariance matrix Rk ∈ R2Nsat×2Nsat can be defined as:
Rk =
⎡⎣ Σk 0
0 Σ˙k
⎤⎦ (1.20)
in which Σ ∈ RNsat×Nsat is a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements are the
pseudorange error variances, while Σ˙ is a diagonal matrix containing the variances
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related to derivatives of pseudoranges. Different solutions have been suggested
in literature to assign numerical values to these variances. The interested reader
can refer to [39] for more insight on some of them. Moreover, the choices for the
pseudorange error variances for urban scenario will be discussed further in Chapter
3.
1.3 Error sources
When the navigation signal is transmitted from the satellite to the receiver, it
is subjected to multiple environmental effect from the propagation medium. This
leads to additional errors when the receiver estimates the pseudorange measure-
ments for the PVT process. Therefore it is necessary to understand the nature
of each error source and the potential error inflicted. In general, the pseudorange
error is contributed most significantly by the atmospheric error when the signal
propagates through the layers, especially the troposphere and the ionosphere, and
multipath error when the signal reflects over physical obstacles along the trajectory.
Detailed description for each error source follows.
1.3.1 Atmospheric error
When the electromagnetic signals from GNSS satellites are propagated to the
user’s receiver, the signals are delayed under the effect of the atmospheric layers.
From the physical point of view, this effect is caused by the refractive index of the
atmosphere layers being different from that of vacuum. The propagation delay can
be modeled in mathematical form as [86]:
datm =
[∫
s
ngrds−
∫
s
ds
]
+
[∫
s
ds− s0
]
(1.21)
where datm denote the propagation delay; s0 is the propagation path in vacuum,
which is the straight line between the satellite and the receiver; s is the actual,
bended trajectory; ngr is the group refractive index of the atmosphere. Note that
ngr varies depending on the height, hence the inclusion of the integral. The first
term on the right side of (1.21) is the optical delay, caused by the refractive index
ngr > 1 thus decreasing the velocity. The second term of (1.21) is the delay due
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to the ray being bended thanks to the phase refractive index nph, called geometric
delay.
The contribution to the propagation delay mainly comes from the ionospheric
and tropospheric layers. However, the nature of the refractive indexes in these
layers are different, hence causing different type of delays.
Tropospheric error
In the tropospheric layer, ngr = nph and only varies with height. As a result,
the group velocity vgr and phase velocity vph are equals, and are defined as:
vgr =
c
ngr
(1.22)
vph =
c
nph
(1.23)
(1.24)
where c is the speed of light. This results in a positive delay in the final ranging
estimation. On the other hand, note that the geometrical delay in (1.21) is, in fact,
negligible for satellites with elevation angles higher than 5 degree. As a result, the
delay in tropospheric error can be written as:
dtropo =
∫
s
(ngr − 1) ds = 10−6
∫
s
Nds (1.25)
where N = 10−6(n−1) is called refractivity. In tropospheric layer, N is divided into
two component: hydrostatic component caused by dry gases, and non-hydrostatic
component caused by water vapor. These two components are also called dry and
wet component, respectively. In fact, the hydrostatic component contributes about
90% of the total delay [77]. The effect of this component depends predictably on the
local temperature and atmospheric pressure and does not change much, therefore
it is possible to develop models for this component. In the field of navigation, the
tropospheric model proposed by [33] is widely used in receivers and augmentation
systems [89]. In general, tropospheric delay ranges about 2-8m, depending on the
elevation angle of the satellites, general location of the user
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Ionospheric error
The distinct characteristic of the ionosphere is the presence of free electrons and
ionized particles, the density of which can vary during the day. The ionized density
may decrease due to energy loss caused by the sun during daytime, thus recombine
into molecules. The increased number of molecules and the absences of the sun
during nighttime cause the molecules to breakup and increase the ionized density
again [35].
In the ionospheric error, the phase refractive index nph depends also on the
frequency. Therefore unlike in the tropospheric layer, it is possible to derive the
relation between ngr and nph as:
ngr =
1
nph
(1.26)
At the frequency of GNSS signals, the refractive indexes can be derived as [35]:
ngr = 1 +
40.3
f 2
Ne (1.27)
nph = 1− 40.3
f 2
Ne (1.28)
where Ne is the electron density (in e−/m3); f is the signal frequency. It can be
observed that, while ngr > 1 as in (1.27), nph is in fact less than 1. This means that
the affected signal will have a group delay with vgr < c while having a carrier phase
advance due to vph > c. In other words, the received signal will have a positive
code measurement delay and a negative carrier phase measurement delay. With
the refractive indexes defined, the actual delay can be written as:
diono,gr(f) =
40.3
f 2
TEC (1.29)
diono,ph(f) = −40.3
f 2
TEC (1.30)
where TEC is the Total Electron Content, is given by the integral of Ne along the
propagation path:
TEC =
∫
s
Neds (1.31)
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The TEC value depends largely on the geographical location of the receiver, the
time during the day and the solar activity. Particularly, equatorial area such as
Brazil or South East Asia (SEA) witness a high level of ionospheric unpredictability
[2]. The resulting ionospheric scintillation besides delay on pseudorange measure-
ment, can even cause lost of track in tracking loops [52]. On the other hand, as
mentioned above, the GNSS signals refraction depends also on the frequency, there-
fore it is possible to use double frequency measurement to remove the delay caused
by the ionosphere [35]. For single frequency, however, there are also prediction
models to mostly remove the delay effect caused by the ionosphere, such as the
Klobuchar model [68] which is widely used in GPS receivers [118]. Alternatively,
the NeQuick-G model is a real-time adaptation of the ITU-R NeQuick ionospheric
electron density model [113, 37, 49], which has been adopted by the Galileo system
for single-frequency ionospheric delay correction [4, 34]. In most cases, the iono-
spheric delay ranges from 3m to 30m, depending on the time of the day (which is
directly related to TEC), elevation angle of the satellite and general location of the
receiver.
1.3.2 Multipath
Figure 1.7: Principle of multipath interference [69]
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Multipath error is a kind of delay caused by the arriving signal reflected on
surfaces near the receiver’s antenna. This is kind of error is prominent in envi-
ronments with a lot of obstacle, such as urban areas where modern buildings with
glass and metal are actually strong reflectors. Due to reflection, the path of the re-
ceived signal is longer than the actual path of Line of Sight (LOS) signal, therefore
inflicts significant delay in pseudorange measurement resulting in positioning error.
In fact, there are two type of multipath: the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) multipath,
where only the reflection arrives at the antenna, and the multipath interference, in
which both the actual signal and the reflected one arrive at the antenna.
NLOS multipath effect is caused by the blocking of the actual LOS signal by
some obstacles. This effect induces a delay in the pseudorange measurement equals
to the path delay, typically about tens of meters [48]. This delay is always positive
due to the reflected signal travels further than the LOS one. The power of the
NLOS is usually weaker than the actual signal, no more than 42 dBHz [136].
On the other hand, the multipath interference is more complex, as both the LOS
and NLOS signals are mixed together (see Figure 1.7 [69]). Multipath interference
causes the distortion of the code correlation peak in the tracking block of the
receiver, resulting in incorrect estimation of the code phase. Depending on the
tracking block design, the induced code phase error can be up to half a code chip
[47, 25], corresponding to about 150 m of pseudorange error for GPS signal.
As mentioned above, multipath error potentially causes significant error to the
positioning process, especially in urban environment [136]. Therefore there has
been multitude of works focused on multipath detection and mitigation techniques.
Notably, since the multipath effect alters the quality of the received signal, several
works propose detection and mitigation method based on C/N0 ratio [48, 59, 26].
On the other hand, there are also other approaches based on dual-polarization
NLOS detecion [58] and vector tracking [51, 50].
Regarding the aspect of multipath modeling, the works in [116, 76] introduce
a configurable urban channel model, called the Land Mobile Multipath Channel
(LMMC) Model. This model, implemented in MATLAB, simulates the multipath
effect caused by a virtual urban environment on satellite telecommunication sig-
nals, in which GNSS is a special case. The model allows the customization of such
virtual urban scenario, including the width of the road and the relative position of
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the receiver on that road, the size of buildings, trees and street poles on either (or
both) sides of the road. With the elevation and azimuth angles of the satellite vary-
ing, the effect caused by the virtual environment also differs, based on underlying
mathematical models developed from extensive data collection campaign in urban
areas [116]. The model has been standardized in International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) document [55].
1.3.3 Interference
Since the operation of GNSS receivers utilize the Radio Frequency (RF) signal
from navigation satellites, it is susceptible to RF interference, whether it is uninten-
tional or intentional (jamming). In literature, RF interference is usually classified
as wideband (WB) or narrowband (NB) [130]. Such classification reflects the band-
width size of the interference in relative with the bandwidth of the actual GNSS
signal. A special case of NB is when the interference has a very narrow bandwidth,
reducing it to a single tone, called continuous wave (CW) interference.
Studies have shown that NB interference poses the most dangerous effects on
the performance of GNSS receivers [14, 11, 130], especially CW interference as
reported in some real cases [12, 64]. In general, NB can impair different stages of the
GNSS receivers, especially the acquisition and tracking stages, leading to incorrect
tracking output or losing track completely [130]. Facing this, in literatures, besides
the works on the effects of interferences [14, 12, 91], there are also many proposed
techniques for detection[83, 54] and mitigation [94, 11, 112, 21, 111].
1.4 Conclusion
This Chapter has presented the overview of the GNSS receiver, including the
architecture and operation, the potential error sources, and most important, the
algorithms for PVT calculation. The output of the PVT evaluation process as
well as its intermediate parameters will be necessary for the integrity assessment
approach, as will be discuss in subsequent Chapters.
It is also important to note that, the PVT calculation process is, in fact, an
approximation process, since the pseudorange input is subjected to external errors
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and uncertainty, rendering the system of geometric equation 1.4 does not have an
unique solution. This is one of many reasons for the necessity of integrity monitoring
concept, which will be discussed in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 2
Integrity monitoring
This Chapter presents about the concept of integrity, its origin and approaches
in the field of civil aviation, where the concept was born. Integrity concerns about
the reliability of the positioning results, which can be obtained from the PVT esti-
mation process introduced in the previous Chapter. Such reliability is particularly
important in the field of civil aviation.
This Chapter consists of three main sections. The first part introduces a gen-
eral introduction to integrity monitoring and related concepts. Since integrity is
a civil aviation concept, the second part of the Chapter dedicates to civil aviation
terminology, as well as the navigation requirement associated with integrity moni-
toring. The last part of the Chapter presents existing approaches and technology
for integrity assessment in civil aviation.
2.1 Integrity concepts
In the field of GNSS, integrity is defined as the capability of a positioning
system to provide timely warning to users when the system becomes unreliable and
should not be used for navigation purposes [133]. In other words, the purpose of
the integrity assessment process concerns with whether the positioning system is
reliable or not, or the level of trust an user can put into said positioning system.
The concept of integrity was born since the early days of the GPS system for civil
aviation. It was defined in the requirement specifications of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to use the GNSS in the Communications, Navigation
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and Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system. The concept of
integrity is necessary due to several reasons:
• The position calculation process is, in fact, an approximation process. Since
there are always errors from various sources, it is impossible to calculate
the exact, true position, only an approximation at certain level of accuracy.
Integrity assessment methods provide a mean to monitor the positioning error
to ensure the reliability of the results.
• There is a possibility of unexpected system-side faults, such as satellite clock
error, ephemeris error, which can cause excessive positioning errors. These
kind of error can affect a limited number of satellites, or most unlikely, a
whole satellite constellation. While traditional integrity monitoring methods
allow users to detect satellites error, recent algorithms also take into account
constellation-wide faults.
• Applications such as aviation involve the safety of human lives. Therefore
integrity monitoring is of crucial importance to ensure the reliability and
safety of the flight, especially in certain phases of flight such as landing or
taking off, where the reliability of the positioning systems is a major tool for
pilots to make decisions.
To realize the integrity assessment process, some concepts have been defined:
• Protection Level (PL): the statistical bound surrounding the calculated
position, ensuring to cover the true position at a certain level of confidence.
PL is defined in horizontal and vertical direction, namely HPL and Vertical
Protection Level (VPL), respectively. The probability of Positioning Error
(PE) exceeding the PL is less than or equal the required integrity risk. The PL
can be calculated using the measurements from the user’s receiver following
the Aircraft-based Augmentation System (ABAS) approach, or from external
augmentation systems such as Satellite-based Augmentation System (SBAS)
or Ground-based Augmentation System (GBAS).
• Alarm Limit (AL): the bound around the true position, which describes the
region that is required to contain the calculated horizontal position. The event
28
2.1 – Integrity concepts
that the actual (absolute) PE exceeds AL is called a situation of Hazardous
Misleading Information (HMI), and the probability of such event is called the
Probability of Hazardous Misleading Information (PHMI). If the PE is de-
tected to have exceeded the AL, the system should be flagged as unavailable
for use. Similar to PL, AL is also defined in horizontal and vertical direc-
tion, called Horizontal Alarm Limit (HAL) and Vertical Alarm Limit (VAL),
respectively. AL values are usually defined based on the requirement of the
intended application, subsequently dictates the availability of the positioning
system for such application.
• Integrity risk: the maximum allowed probability of integrity failure, which
is an undetected failure that leads to a HMI event. In other words, the
required integrity risk is the upper limit for the PHMI, and the probability
that PE exceeds PL without detection.
• Time to Alert (TTA): the maximum allowable period from the occurrence
of the fault to the alert being given by the navigation device. This value is
also application-dependent
The concept of integrity sometimes can be mistaken for accuracy, as both con-
cepts involve the statistical distribution of the PE, especially in the field of civil
aviation. In fact, integrity and accuracy are two out of the four parameters used
to evaluate the performance of a GNSS system defined by the Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) [icao1995special] - the other parameters are availability and
continuity. It is important to note that, accuracy not only measures the conformity
of the calculated position of the receiver to the true position, but also associates
the level of certainty of such assessment. The concepts of integrity and accuracy
have several distinctive differences:
• The most important difference is the inclusion of alarm. While accuracy
mainly concerns with the correctness of the positioning solution and does
not require an alarm, integrity assesses the consistency and reliability of such
solution and thus raises alarms when the bad performance of the system may
lead to risky situation.
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• Mathematically, the two concepts utilize different percentile for respective
requirement. In aviation, the accuracy specifications require the accuracy
level measured at the 95% percentile, while the integrity requirement has a
percentile above 99% (leaving the integrity risk ranges between 10−7 to 10−4
depending on the operation).
2.2 Civil aviation concepts
Since the integrity concepts, most existing integrity monitoring methods and
their inherent performance specification are defined for the use in civil aviation.
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce briefly about the terminology and the under-
lying concepts in order to understand correctly about the subsequently introduced
integrity monitoring algorithms. Most of the definitions in this section are taken
from the Pilot/Controller Glossary issued by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) [104].
2.2.1 Phases of flight
Figure 2.1: Typical phases of flight [87]
In civil aviation, a flight consists of multiple phases when an aircraft travels
from its departure to the destination. A comprehensive graph of the phases of
flight can be found in Figure 2.1. In particular, the main phases include:
• Departure: the transition from take-off (end of runway, preceded by other
ground-based operations such as standing, taxi,... ) to the first cruise altitude.
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• En-route: the second main phase, when the aircraft travels from the depar-
ture to the destination airport.
• Approach: the phase when the aircraft attempts to land, containing two sub-
phases. The initial approach is from the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) to Final
Approach Fix (FAF), and the final approach is from FAF to the beginning of
the landing flare - the transition of the aircraft just before touchdown. On the
other hand, if a landing cannot be made safely (due to onboard instrument
errors, hindering weather,...), a missed approach must be performed at the
Missed Approach Point (MAPT), where the pilot aborts the landing operation
and climbs upward, following by other instruction by the Air Traffic Control
(ATC).
The operation of a pilot during approach phase is defined in the Instrument
Approach Procedure (IAP), which is a series of predetermined maneuvers for the
orderly transfer of an aircraft from the beginning of the IAF to a landing or to a
point from which a landing may be made visually.
There are three category of IAP:
• Non Precision Approach (NPA): approach procedures using systems that only
provide lateral guidance and no vertical guidance. In other words, the pilot
only knows the heading of the aircraft, does not receive altitude and glidepath
guidance.
• Approach with Vertical guidance (APV): procedures using systems that pro-
vide both lateral and vertical guidance. APV using GNSS vertical guidance
has 2 performance levels: APV-I and APV-II.
• Precision Approach (PA): standard IAP in which an electronic glideslope/glidepath
is provided. PA systems provide both lateral and vertical guidance at 3 per-
formance levels: CAT-I, CAT-II and CAT-III.
On the other hand, Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance (LPV) is
another form of approaches that specifically relies on GPS positioning and integrity
monitoring service provided by a SBAS in the US called Wide-Area Augmentation
System (WAAS) (see Section 2.3.2). While LPV is considered APV by definition,
it offers performance level equivalent to PA CAT-I [32].
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2.2.2 Navigation system requirements
The requirements for navigation systems in civil aviation are defined by ICAO
with 4 aforementioned parameters: accuracy (95%), integrity, availability and con-
tinuity. While the concepts of accuracy and integrity have been discussed above,
the other 2 concepts are also related to integrity. The availability of a navigation
system defined as the ability of that system to provide the required function and
performance at the initiation of the intended operation. It is characterized by the
percentage of time the system is to be used for navigation during which reliable nav-
igation information is presented to the users [7]. From the practical point of view,
a system is declared available whenever it is able to provide a navigation output
with accuracy and integrity at the level required for a specific operation. On the
other hand, the continuity of a system is the ability of the total system to perform
its function without unscheduled interruption during the intended operation [7].
The integrity requirements for aviation operations are defined in Table 2.1 [46].
Note that while the integrity risk for NPA is defined on per hour basis, that for
other approaches are defined per approach, which is equivalent to 150 seconds.
It is easy to observe that the integrity risk requirement for NPA is significantly
less constrained with respect to other vertical guidance approaches. On the other
hand, since NPA provides lateral guidance only, VAL is not defined for it. On the
other hand, the required level of integrity performance for the approach are quite
different, especially for the VAL. While the integrity risk level is almost identical
for APV and PA approaches, the VAL for APV-II is more stringent than APV-I,
while CAT-I and LPV 200 have almost identical requirements.
The requirements for accuracy, including Horizontal Accuracy (HA) and Vertical
Accuracy (VA), continuity and availability are detailed in Table 2.2 [46]. Similar to
the integrity requirements, NPA does not have a VA requirement, plus the require-
ments are notably more relaxed than other approaches (except for availability).
LPV 200 and CAT-I have almost the same requirements, and in this case, is more
strict than APV approaches.
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Table 2.1: Integrity requirement for aviation approaches [46]
Approach Integrity risk Time-to-alert HAL VAL
NPA 1× 10−7/h 10 s 556 m N/A
APV-I 2× 10−7/approach 10 s 40 m 50 m
APV-II 2× 10−7/approach 6 s 40 m 20 m
PA CAT-I 1× 10−7/approach 6 s 40 m 35 m to 10 m
LPV 200 2× 10−7/approach 6.2 s 40 m 35 m
Table 2.2: Integrity requirement for aviation approaches [46]
Approach HA (95%) VA (95%) Continuity risk Availability risk
NPA 220 m N/A 10−8/h to 10−4/h 10−5 to 10−2
APV-I 16 m 20 m 8× 10−6/15 s 10−5 to 10−2
APV-II 16 m 8 m 8× 10−6/15 s 10−5 to 10−2
PA CAT-I 16 m 6 m to 4 m 8× 10−6/15 s 10−5 to 10−2
LPV 200 16 m 4 m 8× 10−6/15 s 10−5 to 10−2
2.3 Integrity monitoring methods
Integrity monitoring methods are algorithms designed to protect users, and
ensure that integrity is maintained throughout the operation. There are three
main approaches: SBAS, GBAS and ABAS.
2.3.1 Ground-based Augmentation System
GBAS, defined by ICAO, is an augmentation system in which the aircraft re-
ceives augmentation information directly from a ground-based transmitter. The
augmentation data provided by GBAS includes differential correction to improve
positioning solution, and data related to integrity monitoring service. GBAS is
often installed in airports to assist aircrafts when taking off or landing, and is ca-
pable to provide its service to an area up to 23 nautical miles (approx. 42 km)
radius around the host airport. GBAS broadcast the augmentation data in the
VHF frequency band (108 - 118 MHz)
For the correction service, GBAS adopts a positioning techniques known as
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Local Area Differential GPS (LADGPS) [100]. In principle, GBAS (or any DGPS
system in general) utilizes a monitoring and control station on the ground (called
reference station in DGPS terminology) to monitor the navigation signal quality.
Since the exact location of the station is known, it can precisely measure the ranging
errors and transmit them to users. With the provided correction from the ground
monitor station, the receiver on board (called rover in DGPS terminology) can
mitigate potential positioning error, thus improve overall accuracy. Following this
approach, GBAS can correct the errors that are common to both the ground station
and the on board receiver, which includes: ionospheric error, tropospheric error,
satellite clock error and ephemeris error. Other errors that are local to each receiver
cannot be mitigated by GBAS: multipath effect, interference and receiver noise.
For the integrity monitoring service, GBAS also monitors the quality of the
navigation signal with the ground station, and provide a real-time indication that
the signal integrity is ensure or not. GBAS also calculates the PL on the ground
and sends to the user, under the assumptions that:
• The receiver on board is fault-free.
• The pseudoranges of the receiver on board after correction using GBAS data
are affected by noise only, i.e. other errors have already been mitigated.
• One of the reference receiver may be faulted.
• Both ground station and on board receiver use the same satellite constellation.
Currently, GBAS can offer service for APV level I and II [45], PA CAT I [8].
GBAS has also been proposed to cover PA CAT II/III as well [45]. On the other
hand, a map of existing airports around the world currently supporting or testing
GBAS is depicted in Figure 2.2.
2.3.2 Satellite-based Augmentation System
SBAS is defined as a wide coverage augmentation system, in which the user
receives augmentation information from a satellite-based transmitter. SBAS op-
eration is based on the technique of the Wide Area Differential GPS (WADGPS)
[67]. While the LADGPS and GBAS system can only provide correction that are
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Figure 2.2: GBAS facilities world wide
common to both the ground station and airborne receiver and limited to an area
near the airport, WADGPS can generates and broadcast correction for users over a
large coverage area, even over a continent [66]. WADGPS corrections are generated
by a network of monitoring stations operated in the coverage area. In fact, SBAS
and GBAS have several distinctive differences:
• The SBAS broadcast frequency band can be identical to the GPS signals,
while GBAS uses VHF band.
• SBAS utilizes geostationary satellites covering certain area of service, allow
the system to provide service over a larger area then GBAS. In fact, the
satellites of SBAS can also provide ranging measurement similar to GNSS
satellites, thus improves geometry and redundancy for the positioning solution
[7].
• SBAS generates correction data using a network of monitoring station in the
area of service, instead of a few stations installed in an airport as in the case
of GBAS.
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• SBAS provides vector corrections, i.e. individual correction for each type
of error (clock, ionosphere, ephemeris) while GBAS wraps all the error into
scalar pseudorange corrections.
For the integrity monitoring service, SBAS provides the health status of all the
satellites in the monitored constellation [7]. The satellite signals can be declared
"Not monitored", if not visible from the ground stations, or "Do not use" in case of
integrity failure. On the other hand, SBAS also provides a set of parameters for
reliability assessment and PL calculation on the user’s side [88]. The parameters
include:
• User Differential Range Error (UDRE): estimated bound of the pseudorange
residual error after applying the ephemeris/clock correction for each satellite.
• Grid Iono Vertical Error (GIVE): estimated bound of the pseudorange resid-
ual error after applying the ionospheric correction for each satellite.
At each epoch, the PL are computed by the user’s receiver using the parameters
provided by SBAS, airborne parameters, user’s geometry following the SBAS user
algorithm [88]. If the calculated PL exceeds the corresponding AL, the SBAS
service is declared unavailable for the intended opeartion.
Currently, there are several operational SBAS systems in the world (WAAS,
EGNOS, MSAS and GAGAN), others are under implementation or research phase.
WAAS was developed by the US Department of Transportation and the FAA. The
development began in 1994 and the system is activated for general aviation in 2003.
WAAS now covers largely the North America area, including the US (up to Alaska),
Canada and Mexico. WAAS supports en-route, terminal and approach operations
down to PA CAT I [46].
On the other hand, the Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS)
provides SBAS service in Japan area with 2 geostationary satellites and a small
network of monitoring stations and control centres. The system is operational since
2007, and provide guidance service for operations from en-route to NPA. In India,
the GPS-aided GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system was developed to
improve the accuracy of GNSS receivers as well as modernize the CNS/ATM system.
GPS-aided GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) has 15 reference stations, 3
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control centers, 3 satellites (1 of which is geostationary). GAGAN has been certified
for precision approach service APV-I in 2015.
In Europe, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS)
is the latest operational system, developed by the European Space Agency (ESA)
and EUROCONTROL. The system covers the whole European area using 3 GEO
satellites and a network of 40 ground stations. European Geostationary Navigation
Overlay Service (EGNOS) provides 3 basic services:
• Open Service: available to any EGNOS-compatible GNSS receivers, opera-
tional since 1/10/2009.
• EGNOS Data Access Service (EDAS): provide services for professional users
also via ground transmission systems. The data provided includes EGNOS
augmentation message (as also transmitted by EGNOS satllites) and GPS
raw data collected by EGNOS monitoring stations.
• SOL service: mainly for safety-critical application, such as civil aviation. This
service is provided with enhanced and guaranteed performance, and includes
also integrity monitoring features. The service is available since March 2012.
2.3.3 Aircraft-based Augmentation System
While GBAS and SBAS provide integrity monitoring at the system level, the
ABAS approach aims at providing integrity monitoring at sensors/receiver level.
Distinctively, ABAS utilizes a set of integrity assessment algorithms that can oper-
ate autonomously, rely solely on the measurement data from the on board receiver.
Therefore, ABAS allows integrity monitoring service to be available even outside of
SBAS/GBAS coverage, or can be considered a redundancy in presence of other aug-
mentation systems. ABAS also allow detection of highly localized error or receiver
side error, that might not be detected by ground stations of external augmentation
system.
ABAS integrity monitoring service relies on a set of algorithms called Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) [10]. In principle, the integrity assess-
ment process using ABAS algorithms usually consists of two main steps. The first
step is called Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE), in which ABAS exploits the
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redundancy in the observed measurements and performs consistency test to check
for faults in the input data, then the algorithm may attempt to exclude the faulty
input if a fault is detected. If the input is deemed consistent, ABAS proceeds to the
next step, which is to calculate the PL. In short, the goals of the integrity assess-
ment process are to protect users from excessive positioning errors by detecting and
mitigating (if possible) the faults, and alert users in the worst case. Traditionally,
ABAS algorithms operate under several assumptions [10]:
• Only one constellation is used (although it’s possible to extend the algorithm
to multi-constellation),
• There is at most one satellite fault at a time,
• The PL depends mostly on the satellite geometry.
• The measured pseudoranges may be affected by errors from multiple sources
(atmospheric error, satellite clock error, multipath, etc). The error compo-
nents are independent, and the resulting pseudorange error is zero-mean and
Normal-distributed
There are two main approaches for ABAS methods: residual-based approach
[10], which operates in pseudorange domain, and solution separation approach [29],
which runs in position domain. While residual-based ABAS is simple and fast,
solution separation ABAS can have better performance due to its customization
[61]
Range domain
In literature three main FDE algorithms can be categorized in the range domain
[65, 28, 10]: range comparison, least-squares residuals and parity method. All the
methods are able to determine the presence of a satellite failure by using the redun-
dancy of the measurements of the over-determined system of linearized equations
(1.11). FDE algorithms check for the consistency using the so-called Global Test
[71] (also known as range-residual test) that requires at least five satellites in view.
The process of a FDE algorithm comes from the statistical detection theory [99]
and consists in verifying if a quantity (identified as test statistic) exceeds a given
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threshold. The threshold is chosen so that, in fault-free conditions, the test statistic
has a very low probability to pass it, thus ensuring very low false positive alarms.
Under faulty conditions, however, the values achieved by the test statistic is no
longer distributed as in faultless conditions and therefore more likely exceeds the
threshold thus allowing for the recognition of the fault.
Using the set of linearized measurement equations (1.11), the Global Test can
be defined at each epoch k as:
Global Test =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩H0 : E{ϵk} = 0, V ar{ϵk} = Σk if τglobal < TglobalH1 : E{ϵk} /= 0, V ar{ϵk} /= Σk if τglobal > Tglobal (2.1)
where H0 is the fault-free hypothesis; H1 is the fault-present hypothesis; Σk is
the covariance matrix of the pseudorange errors ϵk, which are assumed to be nor-
mally distributed; τglobal and Tglobal are the test statistic and detection threshold,
respectively. In the residual method, τglobal is given by:
τglobal = rˆTkΣ−1k rˆk (2.2)
where rˆk = H¯k∆uˆk −∆ρk is the residual between predicted and measured pseu-
doranges [35]. For Weighted Least Square (WLS) solution, rˆ is given by:
rˆk = H¯k
(
H¯Tk Σ−1k H¯k
)−1
H¯Tk Σ−1k ∆ρk −∆ρk = −Rk∆ρk (2.3)
In faultless conditions the errors in ϵk are normally distributed, thus τglobal
(which is a sum-square of the errors) follows a central Chi-square distribution with
Nsat − p degree of freedom (DOF), where p is the number of parameters to be
estimated, in the case of (1.11) is 4.
The threshold Tglobal, against which the test statistic must be compared, is ob-
tained arbitrarily fixing the probability of false alarm Pfa that is perceived accept-
able for the faulty free condition. It results that
Pfa =
∫ ∞
Tglobal
fχ2(x;Nsat − p)dx (2.4)
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where fχ2(x;K) is the central Chi-square probability density function (pdf) with
K DOF.
Tglobal can then be derived as [10]:
Tglobal = Qχ2(1− Pfa, Nsat − p) (2.5)
where Qχ2(P,K) is the quantile function of the probability P of central Chi-square
distribution with K DOF, while Pfa is the probability of false alarm.
Note that τglobal and Tglobal depend on the number Nsat of available satellites,
therefore in general they are function of the epoch k. This dependence has been
however omitted in the notation for sake of simplicity, also because no change
usually occurs on short time horizon of few minutes.
In the parity method [117], the measurement vector ∆ρk is transformed into
the state estimation space (with p dimension) and an orthogonal space called the
Parity space (with Nsat− p dimension). The parity vector pk is obtained using QR
factorization [65]. From the mathematical point of view, while it is possible to use
both rˆk and pk to calculate τglobal, rˆk in fact contains p constraint corresponding
to the unknowns of (1.11), which may obscure some inconsistency of interest. As
a result, using pk is considered easier to develop fault detection method.
Position domain
The second approach of RAIM consistency test is performed in the position
domain, called Solution Separation (SS) approach [29, 138]. The motivation of
the approach is that, if the whole set of pseudorange measurements is consistent,
then the position calculated using the whole set (called the all-in-view position)
and the those computed using subsets of measurements should be close together, as
exampled on Figure 2.3. The subsets of satellites is called fault mode, corresponding
to a fault hypothesis (i.e. a potential faulty was excluded from that subset), while
the position calculated using such subset is called fault-tolerant position. Intuitively,
excessive separation of fault-tolerant positions indicate potential satellite faults as
well as candidates for exclusion attempt.
Following this, the approach adopts multiple seperate binary tests to perform
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on each subset (called SS tests). The test statistics for each test is simply the sepa-
ration between the all-in-view position u(0)k and the subset position u
(q)
k calculated
by the qth subset. The detection threshold is derived from the covariance of the
separation and the desired probability of false alarm Pfa [138].
Figure 2.3: Solution separation consistency test
Recent methods
Comparatively, residual-based RAIM is simple to implement and fast, since
there is only one Global Test required for consistency test (futher Local Test may be
needed for exclusion), the SS RAIM in position domain can have better performance
due to its customization [61]. In fact, the simplicity of residual-based RAIM sees
it becomes the baseline algorithm for numerous works, such as the Weighted Least
Square Residual (WLSR) RAIM with adaptive Pfa [3] to ensure availability at all
times. The work in [137] combines both approach into a hybrid FDE method, in
which SS tests are adopted for fault detection, and residual-based tests are used
for fault exclusion.
Recent works have proposed many optimization in different aspects to improve
the performance of traditional RAIM algorithms. The works in [27, 5] allow detec-
tion of more than one failure, given enough measurements, thus effectively improve
the single-fault assumption of traditional RAIM. Moreover, a variant of residual-
based RAIM called Novel Integrity-Optimized RAIM (NIORAIM) [53] proposes
41
2 – Integrity monitoring
the use of a suboptimal weighting in the LS process to improve the integrity per-
formance and availability of the system. The weighting for the SS approach is also
optimized by the Optimally Weighted Average Solution (OWAS) [75]. The Multi-
ple Hypothesis Solution Separation RAIM (MHSS RAIM) [17, 19, 74] proposes the
allocation of the integrity risk optimally between different types of system fault.
From another approach, the work in [96] suggests the computation of PHMI directly
from the input measurement.
On the other hand, ABAS algorithms for KF-based positioning method have
also been recently proposed. Most methods follow residual-based approach, using
the innovation vector [132, 140] or the ranging residual vector [62, 15] for the
consistency test, as well as corresponding methods to calculate the PL.
In the field of civil aviation, recent works in navigation integrity [134, 103, 20, 19,
74] have led to the next generation of ABAS algorithm, called Advanced Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) [134, 18], based on the SS approach
(for LS). ARAIM improves the traditional ABAS in various ways, such as multi-
constellation capability, generalized satellite fault hypothesis instead of single-fault
assumption. ARAIM also adopts a noise model developed from extensive data
collection campaign tailored for aviation use [84], allowing optimal weighing for
weighted LS computation in such environment. ARAIM aims at providing better
availability, lower PL [125, 92, 85], making it suitable for more stringent phases of
flight which are usually protected by SBAS and GBAS [18]. The overall scheme of
the ARAIM algorithm is depicted in Figure 2.4. Interested readers can find detailed
description and derivation of ARAIM in [134, 18].
2.4 Conclusion
Integrity monitoring measures the level of trust an user can put into the navi-
gation solution evaluated from a receiver. This issue is of particular importance in
the field of civil aviation, where such reliability relates to the lives of the passengers.
Integrity requirements are defined for the approach phase, where the knowledge of
vertical position of the plane is very important to the decision of the pilot. This
Chapter has introduced the concept of integrity, its necessity and requirement in
the context of civil aviation, as well as the main approaches for integrity monitoring,
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Figure 2.4: Scheme of the ARAIM algorithm
in particular the ABAS approach which can be implemented on receiver side.
Amidst the presented methods and approaches for integrity monitoring, this
thesis aims at designing a new method for integrity assessment in urban scenario.
The new method is based on the most recent ARAIM algorithm, which follows the
SS approach, but will be adapted for KF instead of the original LS. Furthermore,
the new method will operate in a different environment (urban scenario), which
will require necessary changes to fit the requirement of the new environment. More
detailed discussion and explanation in term of motivation, survey as well as the
development of the proposed algorithm will be presented in subsequent Chapters.
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Chapter 3
Adapting ARAIM algorithm for
urban environment
With increasing interest in the concept of integrity in applications other than
the original civil aviation use, it is necessary to study the required change to the
integrity assessment algorithms to suit the characteristics of the new environment.
It is crucial to note that, the environment in urban scenario is vastly different from
the airports, where the RAIM/ARAIM algorithms were originally designed for.
This Chapter discusses the motivation for adapting the ARAIM algorithm to urban
environment, then investigates the necessary changes to the ARAIM algorithm,
most importantly the noise model for modeling the pseudorange errors. Various
options for the noise model are also studied and compared using simulated data, in
order to choose a suitable model. A part of the content in this Chapter has been
published in [124].
3.1 Recent works on integrity monitoring in ur-
ban environment
Although initially developed for the field of aviation, the concept of integrity has
gain vast interest in other applications as well, especially those that require high
level of reliability for the navigation data, such as railways [79, 97, 56], or ITS [16],
where reliability is very important to ensure the operational of the applications
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[36, 121]. An example is the Liability Critical Applications [13] in road traffic
management, where the computed PVT are the used as input for subsequent legal
decisions or economic transactions, such as in a automatic road tolling collection
system. Consequently, any positioning error exceeding a certain threshold can lead
to a misjudged legal decision or miscalculated transaction, which undoubtedly also
lead to legal issues. This raises the problem of keeping the positioning error below
a certain level, or rather, monitor and bound the error with a very high level of
confidence and alert users in case of breach. This problem is, in fact, close to what
the concept of integrity was developed for [36].
This leads to the interests of adapting the integrity monitoring concept into
urban scenario. Among the three approaches mentioned in Section 2.3, GBAS can
be considered the most limited approach. As mentioned earlier, GBAS requires the
installation of ground stations in the area of operation, which can be costly. On
the other hand, GBAS reference stations have to be located in areas that is not
affected by multipath or other interferences, which is the opposite characteristics
of urban areas. Therefore GBAS is not the ideal choice for integrity monitoring in
urban environment.
On the other hand, [110, 122] propose to use SBAS to calculate the PL for
urban applications. However, currently the SBAS coverage around the world is
quite limited, so it is not possible to apply the SBAS approach to the areas without
coverage. Also, it is important to note that, GBAS and SBAS aims at providing
integrity monitoring service on a system perspective, while users in urban areas can
experience other errors that SBAS can not detect, such as multipath, interferences
or receiver side errors.
This analysis leaves the remaining option to be ABAS, which is also the focus
of a multitude of recent works. The works of [3, 16] attempted to adapt traditional
RAIM algorithm for urban use, but the assumption of the traditional RAIM ap-
proach is not suitable for the urban scenario [72, 43]. Recall from Section 2.3.3 that
the RAIM algorithm assumes single-fault scenario, and the PL depends mostly on
the geometry of the satellites. In fact, in urban environment the navigation signals
are objected heavily by multipath and other interferences, which affect all satellites
indiscriminately. This leads to the possibility of excessive error on more than one
satellites. Multipath in urban area is also a prominent cause for positioning error
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[48] and thus should be considered in calculating the PL. [139] proposed an adap-
tive, residual-based RAIM for urban scenario, but assumed all the pseudorange
errors to have similar error variance, which is not quite realistic in such context.
The study in [124], on the other hand, suggested several necessary points to change
to adapt ARAIM algorithm to urban context, such as the noise model and integrity
risk allocation.
3.2 List of changes
3.2.1 Limitation of aviation-based integrity for urban envi-
ronment
It is important to note that, the original integrity concept and its extensive
array of integrity assessment techniques are systematically developed for aeronau-
tical usage, tailored for its characteristic environment and requirement. As a result,
adapting integrity monitoring methods, particularly ARAIM algorithm, from avi-
ation to urban context is not a trivial task. There are several recent studies [82,
36, 124] mentioning the limitation of aviation-based integrity monitoring methods
(ARAIM algorithm in particular) for urban use, notably two main points: strict
requirement, and the noise model for the pseudorange error variances.
The first point is the strict requirement of the algorithm. As introduced in the
previous Chapter, the ARAIM was designed to satisfy the stringent requirement
of the LPV-200 procedure (see Section 2.2.2 for more details). While a similar
set of standard for vehicular applications is not available yet, such requirement in
aviation context is still considered too strict for urban use [82, 106]. In this case,
the requirement includes the integrity and continuity risk, the AL (especially HAL,
considering urban applications usually need to know the location of vehicles on a
planar map), which need to reconsider to suit the urban use. On the other hand,
in order to meet the aforementioned strict requirement of LPV-200 procedure, the
ARAIM algorithm also incorporate the use of nominal bias [18], taking into account
the small errors that remain constant in a short period of time [81]. This may not
be necessary for urban applications.
47
3 – Adapting ARAIM algorithm for urban environment
The second point is the noise condition between the two environment and asso-
ciated noise model. The most prominent environmental difference between aviation
context and urban environment is the multipath condition. In aviation, the large
part of the multipath comes from reflection on the ground and on the body of the
aircraft itself [84]. However, the multipath condition in urban areas is much more
complex, due to reflection on buildings, trees, other infrastructures, as pointed out
in Section 1.3.2. This results in larger amplitude of error from multipath, as well
as more unpredictable [136, 48, 36]. Therefore, the existing error model currently
adopted in ARAIM algorithm, which estimates the error based on satellites’ eleva-
tion angles, is not sufficient to model such kind of multipath error.
The brief analysis above leads to the following changes in the ARAIM algorithm
to adapt it to urban environment:
• The values of constants associated with the requirement
• The nominal biases
• The noise model
More in-depth analysis and solutions for each point above will be presented in
subsequent Sections of this Chapter.
3.2.2 Values of constants
ARAIM algorithm [18] utilizes a set of constants to describe the integrity, con-
tinuity budget and allocation, as well as several thresholds for the SS tests. The
Probability of Hazardous Misleading Information PHMI values represent the in-
tegrity budget, or the risk of integrity violation during operation. The false alarm
PFA values represent the continuity budget, or the risk of discontinuity due to
false alarm. The values for integrity and continuity budget in [18] are from [6],
standardized for aviation, and allocated to horizontal and vertical directions. The
constraints for these parameters are:
PHMI,V ERT = PHMI − PHMI,HOR > 0 (3.1)
PFA,V ERT = PFA − PFA,HOR > 0 (3.2)
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where PHMI,HOR and PHMI,V ERT are the horizontal and vertical allocation of PHMI ,
respectively. Likewise, PFA is allocated to PFA,HOR and PFA,V ERT for horizontal
and vertical directions.
From the mathematical point of view, too tight integrity and continuity budget
will increase the resulting PL, thus reduce the availability of the positioning system
and vice versa. In fact, the values for those constants are usually based on the
requirement of the intended application. For example, in the case of LPV 200
procedure (see Section 2.2), PHMI is 10−7, allocating much of the budget to the
vertical component, thus PHMI,V ERT is 9.8× 10−8 while PHMI,HOR is just 2× 10−9.
These values are very tight, considering the intended use of ARAIM algorithm for
integrity monitoring when the plane is about to land, which undoubtedly require
very high reliability on the vertical positioning. On the other hand, [43] suggests
some reference values for Road tolling and Emergency support of urban road, which
are less tight than the aviation counterpart. The values are reported on Table 3.1,
which contains also the aviation constants for comparison purpose.
Table 3.1: Integrity requirement for different applications
Service Horizontal Alarm Limit (m) Time to Alert (s) PHMI
Road tolling 10− 50 6− 10 10−4
Emergency support 5− 10 1− 2 10−5
LPV-200 (aviation) 40 6.2 10−7
In term of allocation, for road traffic applications, the accuracy on the horizontal
direction is more important than on the vertical direction. Therefore the budget
for the horizontal component should be higher. This applies for both the integrity
risk and the continuity risk. An example of risk budget allocation is proposed in
Table 3.2. Note that the integrity risk budget in this case refers to the Road tolling
application in Table 3.1.
3.2.3 Nominal biases
Recall that the ARAIM algorithm aims at satisfying the strict requirement
of LPV-200 approach [18], which has smaller limits than NPA. This leads to the
consideration of small range errors (due to multiple sources) that remain constant
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Table 3.2: Interity and continuity budget allocation
Constant Value
PHMI 10−4
PHMI,HOR 9.8× 10−5
PHMI,V ERT 2× 10−6
PFA 4× 10−6
PFA,HOR 3.9× 10−6
PFA,V ERT 10−7
in a period of time. These errors are modeled as nominal biases [18, 103], i.e. biases
when the receiver operates in a fault-free condition [80]. ARAIM utilizes a model
for nominal biases, which is developed based on smoothed dual frequency (L1-L5)
multi-constellation (GPS/Galileo) signal. The sources of errors for nominal biases
are [81]:
Nominal signal deformation: perturbation affecting the signal waveform trans-
mitted by the satellite as observed by the receiver (affecting the correlation
between the received signal and the local signal). These deformations af-
fect signals in each band independently and of course will affect the signal
combination as well.
User antenna group delay variation: delay according to the angle of arrival
with respect to the center of measurement. Analysis in [81] shows that the
antenna group delay depends on the user antenna, the azimuth and elevation
angle of the incoming signal, the electromagnetic fields radiated by various
part of the aircraft itself.
Satellite antenna group delay variation: bias depending on the nadir angle,
which is not fully reflected in the User Range Error (URE) value broadcasted
from the satellite.
The working condition in urban context is different from the condition listed
above when considering the nominal biases:
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• The occasional urban canyons and trees can cause cycle slips or losing track
ofsatellites, therefore carrier phase positioning may not always be available.
• The antennas for mass market receivers on urban vehicles are different from
antennas used for receivers on aircraft, therefore models for nominal biases
based on experiments in aviation scenario would not be applicable.
• The main reason for including the nominal biases in ARAIM is the high re-
quirement of the intended application in aviation. The requirement for urban
applications is less strict than aviation, observing the proposed integrity bud-
get mentioned above. Therefore the effect of nominal biases can be negligible.
Thus, it is advisable to remove the nominal biases when adapting ARAIM to
urban environment.
3.2.4 Noise models
Noise model is the statistical representation of the pseudorange error ϵk in
(1.11). For ARAIM algorithm, the noise model represents its assumption about the
input pseudorange measurements quality which are affected by errors from various
sources. When adapting ARAIM to urban use, the most announced difference
between urban environment and airport environment is arguably the multipath
condition. While in aviation, the multipath effect is mainly caused by reflecting
on the ground (while landing) or on the body of the plane itself [84], multipath in
urban environment is caused by tall buildings, trees and other obstacles. Therefore
it is necessary to study the impact of the noise model on the integrity monitoring
performance of ARAIM, and from there choose a correct model for the intended
urban environment.
Current noise model in ARAIM
The noise model of ARAIM is used to calculate the pseudorange error covariance
matrices for integrity and continuity monitoring. The diagonal covariance matrices
are defined by [18]:
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Cint(i, i) = σ2URA,i + σ2tropo,i + σ2user,i (3.3)
Cacc(i, i) = σ2URE,i + σ2tropo,i + σ2user,i (3.4)
where Cint is the covariance matrix for integrity-related calculation; Cacc is the
matrix for accuracy and continuity process; σURA,i and σURE,i are the standard
deviation of the clock and ephemeris error of the ith satellite used for integrity and
accuracy, respectively; σtropo,i is the standard deviation of the tropospheric delay,
σuser,i represents the user contribution to the error budget.
For GPS, σuser,i is given by[88]:
σGPSuser,i =
√ f 4L1 + f 4L5
(f 2L1 − f 2L5)2
√
σ2MP + σ2noise (3.5)
σMP,i = 0.13[m] + 0.53[m] exp
(
− θi10[deg]
)
(3.6)
σnoise,i = 0.15[m] + 0.43[m] exp
(
− θi6.9 deg
)
(3.7)
where fL1 is the carrier frequency of GPS L1 signal (1575.42 MHz) and fL5 is
the carrier frequency of GPS L5 signal (1176.45 MHz); θi is the elevation angle in
degrees; σMP,i represents the error due to airframe multipath; σnoise,i is the error due
to wideband noise and interference. It is important to note that the models follow
aviation standard [88], developed using carrier-smoothed data from multitude of
flights and data collection campaign [84], thus reflecting the working environment
of aviation application. The final model represents the error variance as a function
of satellite’s elevation angle.
For Galileo, σGalileouser,i is given in tabular form, and also depends on the elevation
angle of the satellites (see Table 3.3 [18], where θi is the elevation angle).
Effect of noise level on the Protection Level
In order to see how sensitive and critical it is to have a good model for integrity
assessment in urban environment, an experiment was conducted (on a real dataset)
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Table 3.3: Galileo elevation dependent SIS user error [18]
θi σ
Galileo
user,i θi σ
Galileo
user,i
5° 0.4529 m 50° 0.2359 m
10° 0.3553 m 55° 0.2339 m
15° 0.3063 m 60° 0.2302 m
20° 0.2638 m 65° 0.2295 m
25° 0.2593 m 70° 0.2278 m
30° 0.2555 m 75° 0.2297 m
35° 0.2504 m 80° 0.2310 m
40° 0.2438 m 85° 0.2274 m
45° 0.2396 m 90° 0.2277 m
to see the effect of different levels of noise on the computed PL. Because the exact
noise model is unknown, the experiment started with the ARAIM noise model and
used a multiplier, denoted α, on the user noise component to simulate different
noise levels. In particular, (3.5) becomes:
σGPSuser,i = α
√
σ2MP + σ2noise (3.8)
Since
√
f4L1+f
4
L5
(f2L1−f2L5)
2 ≈ 2.5, the value of α was chosen from 2.5 to 9 in order to
simulate the high noise level in urban scenario. This multiplier was applied for all
GPS satellites in view. For each value of α, the noise model was recalculated and
fed to the ARAIM implementation. The output of the process is the PL. The whole
process is implemented in MATLAB.
The data input was a real dataset recorded in NAVIS Centre, Hanoi, Vietnam
March 24, 2013, when all 4 available Galileo satellites (at that time) flew over
Hanoi. With the clear sky condition, the data set captured about 13-16 satellites
in view in total (for GPS and Galileo satellites). For the Galileo satellites, the user
contribution σGalileouser,i is defined in tabular form, also depending on the elevation
angles of the satellites [18]. The multiplier α was also applied to Galileo satellites
by multiplying directly to the predefined values.
The result of the experiment is depicted in Figure 3.1, which shows the HPL
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Figure 3.1: HPL with different levels of noise, using multiplier α
with different values of α. This output shows that altering the noise level can affect
the HPL, thus altering the availability of the algorithm. It is also important to note
that, higher noise level (higher α) does not necessarily lead to higher HPL. This
observation is depicted in Figure 3.2, which compares the results (HPL, number of
satellites) of two cases of α = 7 and α = 9. There are several periods in which
higher α had more satellites (as highlighted on the figures), resulting in better
geometry. Figure 3.3 shows the skyplot of such highlighted period along with the
C/N0 value for each satellites. Galileo satellites are marked with number higher
than 40, i.e. number 41, 42, 49, 50 corresponds to Galileo PRN 11, PRN 12, PRN
19, PRN 50, respectively. No satellite was excluded in case of α = 9, while satellite
Galileo PRN 11 (satellite 41) was excluded in case of α = 7 as marked on Figure
3.2a. While having the lowest C/N0 value, the low elevation angle of this satellite
improves the overall geometry in case of α = 9, resulting in lower HPL and better
availability. In fact, the noise level also affects the SS detection threshold, increases
the tolerance towards satellites with lower signal quality in the exclusion process.
On the other hand, the robustness of the algorithm is also worth mentioning.
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(a) α = 7
(b) α = 9
Figure 3.2: HPL and number of satellites in two cases of α
While the noise level increased nearly 4 times from the designed level (α from 2.5 to
9), HPL value only increased in order of meters. Nevertheless, with the observation
above, if the real working condition of the urban environment application (or any
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Figure 3.3: Skyplot of the highlighted period
other intended environment) is not as good as the aviation case – mass market
receiver, low quality antennas, hostile environment, then using the aviation noise
model may result in assessing the integrity situation incorrectly and potential loss
of availability.
3.3 Noise model alternatives for urban environ-
ment
Considering the importance of finding a good model that can truly represents the
working condition of the urban environment, this section is dedicated to investigate
three alternatives for ARAIM’s model, namely the Mixed Gaussian model [128, 93],
a model for urban scenario proposed by Salos Andres for WLSR RAIM [3], and a
model proposed by Kuusniemi which bases on C/N0 ratio [70].
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(a) Nominal condition
(b) Constrained condition
Figure 3.4: Example of pseudorange residual distribution for two different satellites
[128]
3.3.1 Mixed Gaussian model
The idea of the Mixed Gaussian model [128, 93] is that, while in nominal condi-
tion, the pseudorange error distribution is Gaussian in line-of-sight reception state,
but in a constrainted environment the distribution is unknown. Figure 3.4 [128]
shows two different types of error (pseudorange residual) distribution according to
the received satellite. While the error distribution in clear sky condition can be
approximated by Gaussian distribution (Figure 3.4a), in a constrained condition it
is not trivial to use a single Gaussian model (Figure 3.4b) Therefore, [128] propose
approximating the pseudorange error distribution in a constrained environment
by a linear mixture of Gaussian distributions. The unknown density function is
expressed by:
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fX(x) =
NG∑
k=1
pkfX,k(x) (3.9)
where NG is total number of mixture Gaussian component; pk is the weight of the
kth component; fX,k(x) is the density function of the kth component, with mean µk
and variance σ2k. In practice, using pseudorange residuals from consecutive epochs,
it is possible to evaluate µk and σ2k following the Expectation-maximization (EM)
clustering algorithm [108].
It is necessary to derive the expression for the variance of the mixed function.
From the definition of the mixed function, the ith (raw) moment can be written as:
µ(i) = EfX
{
X i
}
=
NG∑
k=1
pkEfX,k
{
X i
}
=
NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(i)
k (3.10)
where µ(i) is the ith moment of fX and µ(i)k is the ith moment of fX,k.
Thus, the variance of the mixed distribution can be written as:
var {X} = σ2X = µ(2) −
(
µ(1)
)2
=
NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(2)
k −
⎛⎝NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(1)
k
⎞⎠2 (3.11)
On the other hand, for any kth component, it is possible to write:
µ
(2)
k = σ2k +
(
µ
(1)
k
)2
(3.12)
Substitute (3.12) into (3.11), yields:
var {X} =
NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(2)
k −
⎛⎝NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(1)
k
⎞⎠2
=
NG∑
k=1
pk
(
σ2k +
(
µ
(1)
k
)2)−
⎛⎝NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(1)
k
⎞⎠2
=
NG∑
k=1
pkσ
2
k +
NG∑
k=1
pk
(
µ
(1)
k
)2 −
⎛⎝NG∑
k=1
pkµ
(1)
k
⎞⎠2 (3.13)
In other words, the variance of the mixed function is the weighted sum of the
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components’ variances, plus a non-negative term representing the dispersion of the
mixed distribution.
In practice, the process to evaluate the mixed variance can be implemented as
follows:
• For each satellite, pseudorange residuals from consecutive epochs are recorded
and used to evaluate µk and σk using EM method.
• The error variance for each satellite can be calculated using expression (3.13).
• The estimated error variances are put into the pseudorange error diagonal
covariance matrices of ARAIM [18].
On the other hand, it is possible to apply a sliding window when calculating the
means and variances to keep the values current, as well as saving computational
time. It is worth mentioning that, choosing a good value for NG can be tricky
depending on the situation, and can be done via experiments and observation.
3.3.2 Andres’s model
The second alternative for ARAIM noise model is developed by Salos Andres
in [3] for a WLSR RAIM algorithm for urban application. The noise model in
this work follows a similar approach to ARAIM’s model, consisting of numerous
component corresponding to different sources of error:
• Tropospheric error
• Ionospheric error
• Multipath error (LOS)
For tropospheric error, the same model proposed for ARAIM is adopted. On the
other hand, for ionospheric error, [3] derived the model from the standard model
for civil aviation GPS L1/CA receivers. The final model can be written as:
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σiono = F × τv =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
F × 9 0 ≤ φ < 20
F × 4.5 20 ≤ φ < 55
F × 6 55 ≤ φ
F = 1 + 16
(
0.53− θ180 deg
)3
(3.14)
where φ is the geomagnetic latitude of the receiver; θ is the elevation angle of
the satellite in degrees; τv is the minimum standard deviation of vertical errors,
depending on φ [88]; F is the mapping function which scales the ionospheric delay
estimated for signal arriving at the user’s zenith to other elevation angles. It is also
important to note that ionospheric error is not considered in the error model of
ARAIM, due to the assumption that the receivers should operate in dual-frequency
mode, thus mitigating the ionospheric error. However, this may not be the case for
receivers used for urban environment applications.
For multipath error, [3] analysed simulated pseudoranges which had been altered
by the effects the LMMC Model [116, 76] (see Section 1.3.2). The scheme of the
simulation is as follow:
• The urban channel model simulates a vehicle travelling on a 20 m-wide road,
with buildings, trees and lampposts on both sides of the road. The height,
density of obstacles on both sides are configurable. Using this model, it is
possible to calculate a collection of received signal rays from a satellite with
varying elevation and azimuth angles.
• The resulting signals are processed by a tracking module to compute the
pseudorange error and additional PLL and DLL outputs. Since the correct
range from the receiver and the simulated satellite is known at any time
instant, the error calculation is straightforward.
• A lock detector based on PLL error and C/N0 decides whether the receiver
is tracking the signal or not.
The result of the simulation is depicted on Figure 3.5 [3]. Besides the narrow-
band version of GPS L1 C/A, the multipath errors do not depend on the varying
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Figure 3.5: Multipath nominal error model
elevation angle, unlike the model developed for aviation application. This model
does not cover the NLOS multipath with large delays, because such effect would
render the receiver unable to track the signal, thus excluding the samples from the
model evaluation.
This model had been validated on simulated data in [3].
3.3.3 Kuusniemi’s model
The third option for the noise model in urban scenario is developed by Heidi
Kuusniemi in [70]. The model is the result of analyzing pseudorange and pseudor-
ange rate errors in degraded environment (indoor and urban areas), can be consider
a solution to improve the solution estimation for weighted positioning approaches,
as well as to enhance the performance of reliability assessment process.
In nominal condition (clear visibility, low multipath), the amount and impact
of pseudorange errors are usually coherent with the satellites’ elevation angles.
Higher elevation angles give better signal quality, and vice versa. This observation
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has been reflected in the current noise model of ARAIM, which is based on real
world observation [84]. However, for constraint environment, such as indoor or
urban areas, this may not be the case [131]. In fact, [70] points out the better
correlation between pseudorange errors and received signal quality, represented by
the C/N0 ratios. As a result, a noise model for pseudorange and pseudorange rate
error was proposed and validated using real data collected in extensive period of
time. The noise models for pseudorange error and pseudorange rate error are given
as [70]:
σ2i = a+ b× 10
−C/N0,i
10 (3.15)
σ˙2i = a˙+ b˙× 10
−C/N0,i
10 (3.16)
where σ2i and σ˙2i are the variance for pseudorange error and pseudorange rate error,
respectively; C/N0,i is the carrier to noise ratio of the signal from the ith satellite,
which is time dependent; a, b, a˙ and b˙ are the coefficients of the model whose
values depend on the assumed environment. Some examples of these coefficients
are reported in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Example values for measurement error variance model
Parameters Lightly degraded Heavily degraded
a (m2) 10 500
b (m2Hz) 1502 106
a˙ (m2/s2) 0.01 0.001
b˙ (m2Hz/s2) 25 40
3.4 Comparison of noise models
In this section, previously introduced noise models will be studied and compared
using simulated data. As discussed earlier, a good noise model for ARAIM should
be able to represent as close as possible the quality of the measurement, as well as
its changes over time. Therefore, the noise models will be superimposed on actual
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pseudorange errors obtained from simulated data to verify this.
3.4.1 Signal simulator
The experiments in this work utilize a simulated data set generated by a MATLAB-
based generator. The adopted signal generator is an updated version of the work
in [120], with additional multi-constellation support (GPS and Galileo) and a mul-
tipath generator for urban scenario. The multipath generator uses the aforemen-
tioned LMMC Model [116, 76] (see Section 1.3.2). In term of implementation, the
multipath generator can be considered as a filter, using the output of the LMMCM
as impulse response.
The signal generating process is depicted in Figure 3.6. At first, signals of indi-
vidual satellites are generated (for both GPS and Galileo), before passing through
the multipath generator to be mixed with multipath. A power control block then
adjust the power of each signal per predefined C/N0 settings. Next, all the signals
are mixed together, along with white noise before being quantized and saved to
output file.
Figure 3.6: Signal simulation scheme
3.4.2 Simulation scheme
The simulation scenario represents a moving vehicle in urban area for 160 sec-
onds with velocity of about 40 km/h. The route is depicted in Figure 3.7, with a
slope of 8% (about 4.6o) from 90 s to 140 s. This slope can be considered typical
in urban roads in Vietnam. A short segment of the route is affected by multipath
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(on all satellites), from 106 s to 154 s. The multipath model was setup in urban
surrounding mode, with a road width of 19 m. Both sides of the road were popu-
lated with buildings (maximum height 40 m), trees and light posts. To be realistic,
in this simulation, the route followed by the car is chosen on the map of Hanoi,
Vietnam, and the parameters selected for the multipath model are consistent with
the real environment. There are 8 GPS and 6 Galileo satellites visible. The skyplot
at the beginning of the simulation is reported in Figure 3.8.
The simulation data was generated with sampling frequency of 16.367 MHz,
intermediate frequency of 4.123 MHz, using 5 bits of quantization. The C/N0
ratio values for all satellites ranges from 37 dB-Hz to 42 dB-Hz, depending on the
elevation angles.
3.4.3 Comparison results
The considering noise models are implemented in a MATLAB-based software
receiver. The actual pseudorange errors are obtainable easily from the data simu-
lation process. The following noise models are implemented:
Original ARAIM error model as described in [18]
Mixed Gaussian model as described in Section 3.3.1. A sliding windows was
also used for this approach, also with the length of 20 epochs. NG was chosen
equal to 2, according to the observation of pseudorange residual distribution
of several satellites in the mentioned data set, as shown on Figure 3.9.
WLSR error model proposed by Andres, as described in Section 3.3.2. Note
that τv = 4.8 since the data set simulates the position in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Kuusniemi’s error model as in [70] and introduced in Section 3.3.3. The pa-
rameters use the Lightly degraded setting in Table 3.4.
The results for two satellites (GPS PRN 6 and Galileo PRN 17) are report in
Figure 3.10, where the actual pseudorange error are shown along with the standard
deviation of the considering noise models. Each model shows similar trend in both
cases. The ARAIM’s noise model gives the lowest value, due to the fact that the
model was developed for a different working environment, as stated earlier, not to
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Figure 3.7: Simulation route
mention better professional receivers on planes. On the other hand, the WLSR’s
model gives the highest value for the standard deviation, considering this is the
closest adaptation of the ARAIM’s model for urban use. It is worth mentioning
that, both models are based on elevation angles of the satellites, which do not
change much during the simulation period (less than 3 minutes), therefore the
values of those model are almost constant throughout the experiment, even during
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Figure 3.8: Simulation skyplot
the short duration of multipath presence.
The Mixed Gaussian yields a standard deviation value in between the ARAIM
and the WLSR noise models, and it does change slightly under the presence of
multipath. This is because the model is calculated based on the actual pseudorange
residuals, which are undoubtedly affected by multipath or any changes in signal
quality. However, the response of this model is not as drastic and immediate as the
case of Kuusniemi’s model, which adapts instantly with the presence of multipath
as well as when it is turned off. The level of Kuusniemi’s model is generally lower
than the Mixed Gaussian, however.
The noise models are also compared statistically in Table 3.5, which reports the
percentage of the standard deviations of the models covering the actual pseudorange
error of the two mentioned satellites, as well as the cumulative percentage on all
available satellites. In fact, at each epoch, the value of the noise model can be
calculated, and compared with the actual pseudorange error (which is known due
to the simulated process). The percentage values reported in Table 3.5 are evaluated
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Table 3.5: Coverage percentage of the noise models’ standard deviations. All values
are in percentage unit.
Noise model GPS PRN 6 Galileo PRN 17 All satellites
σi 3σi σi 3σi σi 3σi
Kuusniemi model 60.65 95.32 57.98 95.11 51.35 92.14
Mixed Gaussian model 65.93 97.52 71.87 95.90 56.49 93.41
WLSR’s model 85.96 100 97.07 100 86.39 100
ARAIM’s model 18.71 52.05 26.90 65.59 73.39 99.45
by counting the number of epochs where the calculated standard deviation (and also
the 3× std. dev.) is higher than the actual error, dividing by the total number of
epochs. Note that, since all models assume Gaussian distribution, the coverage rule
can be the criteria to choose a suitable model, from a statistical point of view. In
detail, 66% of the actual error should be contained within one standard deviation,
and about 99% should be within 3 standard deviation.
The statistical report is coherent with the plots on Figure 3.10 in term of cover-
age. The ARAIM’s model has the lowest coverage, while the WLSR’s model with
the excessive standard deviation covers about 90% of the errors. On the other
hand, the Kuusniemi model and the Mixed Gaussian model share a similar level of
coverage (the Mixed Gaussian is slightly higher), and both are sufficient from the
statistical perspective.
From the analysis of the experiment above, the Kuusniemi model and the Mixed
Gaussian model are the best candidates for noise models in urban scenario, sta-
tistically. The Mixed Gaussian model attempts to represent the errors using a
theoretical approach, while the Kuusniemi model is developed based more on ex-
periments and observation. However, from the implementation point of view, the
Mixed Gaussian is more complex to deploy, requiring the pseudorange residuals
from previous epochs. Also, how to choose a good value for the sliding windows
and the number of distributions is not an easy problem, as mentioned earlier. On
the other hand, the Kuusniemi model’s capability to follow closely the change in
signal quality is its strong point, considering the environment in urban area can
change rapidly when the receiver is in motion. Therefore, the Kuusniemi model is
67
3 – Adapting ARAIM algorithm for urban environment
chosen in this work for modeling pseudorange errors in urban environment.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has listed and investigated three main points to be considered
when adapting the integrity assessment algorithms, ARAIM in particular, to urban
environment. The changes are the algorithm’s constants, which should be consid-
ered under the intended application’s requirement, the nominal biases, which can
be neglected, and the noise model. In fact, the noise model is the most impor-
tant change in this case, as a reliable representation of the working environment is
crucial to the integrity assessment process, as shown in the experiment about the
effect of noise levels on calculated PL. It is shown that, incorrect representation of
the pseudorange error can lead to potential loss of availability. On the other hand,
the experiment also showed the robustness of the ARAIM’s current noise model as
a notable result.
To cope with the noise model question, three alternatives are presented, im-
plemented and compared. Simulation results and statistical results show that the
Kuusniemi model is the best choice for modeling the pseudorange error in urban
environment, notably thanks to the capability to follow the change of signal quality
during the simulation period.
On the other hand, a MATLAB-based signal generator has been developed to
provide simulation data for experiments in this thesis. The generator utilizes the
standardized LMMC Model to simulate the multipath effects which are always
present in urban environment.
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(a) Clean period
(b) Multipath-affected period
Figure 3.9: Pseudorange residual distribution of a satellite during clean and
multipath-affected periods
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(a) GPS PRN 6
(b) Galileo PRN 17
Figure 3.10: Standard deviation of different noise models on two satellites
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Chapter 4
Kalman filter-based ARAIM for
urban environment
In this Chapter, a new algorithm is proposed for integrity monitoring in urban
environment, based on the analysis presented in previous Chapters. The proposed
algorithm, called KF-based ARAIM can be considered an adaptation of the original
LS-based ARAIM (which was developed for aviation) for KF, aiming at providing
integrity assessment in urban scenario. The algorithm applies the solution separa-
tion approach of ARAIM to the KF scheme presented in Chapter 1, also adopting
the C/N0-based noise model introduced in Chapter 3. Part of the content in this
Chapter has been published in [123, 126].
4.1 Concept
The overall scheme of the KF-based ARAIM algorithm is presented on Figure
4.1. Instead of predicting forward using the state transition matrix, the algorithm
calculates the subset Kalman gainsK(q)k , state corrections x
(q)
k and the error covari-
ance matrices P (q)k , using subsets of satellites. Here, q denotes a fault hypothesis
(sometimes called fault mode in literatures[18, 134]) corresponding to a subset of
satellites. The initial all-in-view state vector x(0)k and subset state vectors x
(q)
k are
used as inputs for the SS tests, which measure the consistency of the measurement
based on the deviation between the subset states and the all-in-view state. If any of
the tests fails, exclusion will be attempted on potential faulty satellites. Otherwise,
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Figure 4.1: Scheme of the KF-based ARAIM algorithm
the algorithm will proceed to calculate the Protection Levels, before projecting the
state and error covariance matrix ahead. The whole process is then repeated for
the next epoch.
4.2 Subset derivation
The SS approach of the algorithm involves running the Kalman filter repeatedly
on multiple subsets of satellites. The subset of satellites of fault hypothesis q is
denoted S(q), while S(0) denotes the set containing all the satellites in view. For
each fault hypothesis q, a diagonal matrix W (q) is defined as:
W (q)(i, i) =W (q)(i+Nsat, i+Nsat) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩1 if i is in S
(q)
0 otherwise
(4.1)
With this, the subset observation matrix H(q)k , measurement vector z
(q)
k and
measurement error covariance R(q)k are given by:
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H
(q)
k =W (q)Hk (4.2)
z
(q)
k =W (q)zk
R
(q)
k =W (q)RkW (q) =W (q)W (q)Rk =W (q)Rk
Noting that, both Rk and W (q) are diagonal matrices, therefore their multipli-
cation are commutative. Let R(q)+k be the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of R
(q)
k .
In fact, since the pseudoinverse of W (q) is itself and R−1k is also diagonal, R
(q)+
k is
given by:
R
(q)+
k =W (q)R−1k (4.3)
Replacing (4.2) and (4.3) into (1.15), the subset state covariance matrix P (q)k
can be obtained from:
(
P
(q)
k
)−1
=
(
P−k
)−1
+H(q)Tk R
(q)−1
k H
(q)
k
=
(
P−k
)−1
+HTkW (q)R−1k HTk (4.4)
Similarly, replacing (4.2) and (4.3) into (1.17), the subset Kalman Gain K(q)k
can be written as:
K
(q)
k = P
(q)
k H
(q)T
k R
(q)+
k = P
(q)
k H
T
kW
(q)R−1k (4.5)
The subset state update x(q)k can be expressed as:
xˆ
(q)
k = xˆ−k +K
(q)
k
(
z
(q)
k −H(q)k xˆ−k
)
(4.6)
= xˆ−k + P
(q)
k H
T
kW
(q)R−1k
(
W (q)zk −W (q)Hkxˆ−k
)
= xˆ−k + P
(q)
k H
T
kW
(q)R−1k W
(q)
(
zk −Hkxˆ−k
)
= xˆ−k +K
(q)
k
(
zk −Hkxˆ−k
)
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4.3 Algorithm description
The proposed algorithm uses the apriori estimate xˆ−k and the apriori error co-
variance P−k as inputs. Their initial estimates can be obtained processing several
initialization epochs using least-square positioning method. Once initialized, the
algorithm consists of six steps, detailed as follows (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Detailed scheme of the KF-based ARAIM algorithm
Step 1. All-in-view state update
In this step, the state vector and error covariance are updated following the
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aforementioned KF loop, using all available measurements. Note that the observa-
tion matrix H(0)k has to be defined in ENU coordinate, using the apriori estimate
xˆ−k as the origin. The measurement error covariance matrix R
(0)
k is evaluated for
every epoch based on the C/N0 values of all satellites, using relations (3.15) and
(3.16) [70].
The output state vector and error covariance matrix are denoted xˆ(0)k and P
(0)
k ,
respectively.
Step 2. Number of fault hypotheses
This step follows the formula of conventional ARAIM, presented in [18]. Output
of this step is the maximum number of concurrent satellite faults Nsat,max and the
total number of fault modes Nfault. In other word, Nfault represents the total
number of possible satellite combinations by excluding from 1 to Nsat,max satellites:
Nfault =
Nsat,max∑
g=1
(
Nsat
Nsat − g
)
(4.7)
Step 3. Subset state update
Subset state can be obtained by doing the correction step of KF using a subset
of measurements, excluding potential faulty satellites. For each q from 1 to Nfault,
the algorithm determines:
• The subset state xˆ(q)k ,
• The difference ∆xˆ(q)k between xˆ
(q)
k and xˆ
(0)
k
• The covariance of ∆xˆ(q)k , denoted P
(q)
∆xˆk
The posteriori state covariance P (q)k is obtained from (4.4), rewritten here for
completeness:
(
P
(q)
k
)−1
=
(
P−k
)−1
+HTkW (q)R−1k HTk (4.8)
The subset Kalman gain is computed as (4.5):
K
(q)
k = P
(q)
k H
T
kW
(q)R−1k (4.9)
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The subset state estimation update can be obtained as (4.6):
xˆ
(q)
k = xˆ−k +K
(q)
k (zk −Hkxˆ−k ) (4.10)
The difference between subset state and all in view state updates is thus:
∆xˆ(q)k = xˆ
(q)
k − xˆk
= (K(q)k −Kk)(zk −Hkxˆ−k ) (4.11)
The covariance matrix P (q)∆xˆk of ∆xˆ
(q)
k is calculated as
P
(q)
∆xˆk = P
(0)
k + P
(q)
k
− 2
(
(I −KkHk)P−k (I −K(q)k Hk)T +KkRkK(q)Tk
)
(4.12)
The detailed derivation for P (q)∆xˆk can be found in Appendix A.
The alternative state covariance matrix P (q)k,alt, which will be used to calculate
the PL, is given by:
P
(q)
k,alt =
(
I −K(q)k Hk
)
P−k
(
I −K(q)k Hk
)T
(4.13)
+K(q)k RkK
(q)T
k
The derivation of P (q)k,alt is provided in Appendix B.
Step 4. Solution separation tests
Let s = 1,2,3 corresponds to east, north, up component, respectively. For each
q, the SS test is executed on all 3 components of coordinates: north, east and up.
For each component, the test threshold is calculated as:
T
(q)
k,s = Kfa,sσ∆x,s (4.14)
Where:
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σ∆x,s =
(√
P
(q)
∆xˆk
)
s,s
(4.15)
The coefficients Kfa,s follow the same formula as for ARAIM [18]:
Kfa,1 = Kfa,2 = Q−1
(
PFA_HOR
4Nfault
)
(4.16)
Kfa,3 = Q−1
(
PFA_V ERT
2Nfault
)
(4.17)
Where Q−1(p) is the (1 − p)-quantile of a Normal distribution; PFA_HOR and
PFA_V ERT are the probability of false alarm allocated along the horizontal and
vertical direction, respectively, and are usually chosen based on the intended appli-
cation.
The SS test is considered passed if for all q and s we have:
τ
(q)
k,s =
⏐⏐⏐∆xˆ(q)k,s⏐⏐⏐
T
(q)
k,s
≤ 1 (4.18)
Step 5. Checking for exclusion
If all the SS tests are passed, the whole satellite set is considered clean, and the
all-in-view state vector and associated matrices will be used for the projection step.
In contrast, if any of the test failed, the fault hypothesis with failed test becomes
a candidate for exclusion.
The failed fault hypotheses are sorted in decreasing order of τ (j)k,s , with j denotes
any failed fault hypothesis, or exclusion candidate. For each j, the satellites set
S(j) are treated as all-in-view set, then the algorithm (from Step 1 to Step 4) is
executed again, using all subset solution xˆ(j,q)k within the candidate set S(j). If all
the SS test of the considering candidate are passed, i.e. τ (j,q)k,s < 1 ∀q /= j, then S(j)
is considered a consistent satellite set, the remaining satellites (those in S(0)−S(j))
will be excluded. The state vector and associated matrices of S(j) will then be used
for subsequent calculation step.
When a good satellite set is found (with all SS tests passed), the algorithm
will proceed to Protection Level calculation. On the other hand, if none of the
candidate is deemed consistent, the algorithm will give out an inconsistent alert.
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Step 6. Protection Level
Define:
σ(q)s =
√[
P
(q)
k,alt
]
s,s
∀q = 0..Nfault (4.19)
Let PHMI,V ERT and PHMI,HOR denote the integrity risk allocated to the vertical
and horizontal, respectively. Similar to PFA_HOR and PFA_V ERT , the allocated
integrity risks are chosen based on the intended application. In case of no exclusion,
the VPL is the solution to the equation:
PHMI,V ERT = 2Q
(
V PL
σ
(0)
3
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝V PL− T (q)k,3
σ
(q)
3
⎞⎠ (4.20)
Where Q(·) is the complement of the Normal cumulative distribution function.
Similarly, the HPL is calculated on 2 directions of the horizontal plane, namely
HPL1 and HPL2, as follows (with s = 1,2):
1
2PHMI,HOR = 2Q
(
HPLs
σ
(0)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPLs − T (q)k,s
σ
(q)
s
⎞⎠ (4.21)
The final HPL is then computed as:
HPL =
√
HPL21 +HPL22 (4.22)
On the other hand, if exclusion was attempted and subset candidate j was
excluded from the satellite set, then the PL equations are defined to account for
the event. In this case, the VPL is the solution to the equation:
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PHMI,V ERT = 2Q
(
V PL
σ
(j)
3
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
V PL
σ
(q)
3
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝V PL− T (j,q)3
σ
(j,q)
3
⎞⎠ (4.23)
where Nfault,j is the number of fault hypotheses in the remaining set of satellites
after excluding exclusion candidate j.
The HPL is calculated in similar manner as in the no detection case:
1
2PHMI,HOR = 2Q
(
HPL1
σ
(j)
1
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
HPL1
σ
(q)
1
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPL1 − T (j,q)1
σ
(j,q)
1
⎞⎠ (4.24)
1
2PHMI,HOR = 2Q
(
HPL2
σ
(j)
2
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
HPL2
σ
(q)
2
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPL2 − T (j,q)2
σ
(j,q)
2
⎞⎠ (4.25)
HPL =
√
HPL21 +HPL22 (4.26)
The detailed derivation to obtain the PL equations is provided in Appendix B.
The method to solve these equation is provided in Appendix C.
It is important to note that, the proposed algorithm and its underlying KF
model adopt the Kuusniemi’s noise model, from the analysis in the previous chapter.
With this model adopted, the presence of multipath (or the change of signal quality
in general) can affect the PL. In the presence of multipath, the C/N0 ratios of
affected satellites drop, which increase Rk. This leads to the increase of σ(q)s and
Tk,s(q) for all q, due to Tk,s(q) is calculated from P (q)∆xˆk (as in (4.14) and (4.15)). As
a result, the PL increases. Intuitively, the drop of signal quality leads to a higher
PL, as the receiver should expect higher error in such situation. Section 4.4.1 will
further confirm this analysis in an experiment.
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4.4 Performance analysis
The proposed KF-based ARAIM algorithm has been implemented in MATLAB
and tested against simulation data as well as real data collection. The simulated
data is generated from a MATLAB signal generator introduced in Section 3.4.1,
with the configuration described in Section 3.4.2. The simulated data allows the
algorithm to be tested in a controlled environment, where the errors are known
(such as pseudorange measurement errors, positioning errors), thus validating the
proposed algorithm. Also, the simulated data consists of clean and multipath-
affected segment, thus showing distinctive behaviour of the algorithm in different
signal condition.
On the other hand, the real data set is collected in Turin, Italy 1. Experiment on
real data can show how the algorithm behaves and responses in a realistic scenario,
where the car is moving through different environments.
The test results on both sets of data are presented below.
4.4.1 Results on simulation data
Subset positions
A pseudorange bias of 200m was injected to two satellites (PRN 2 of GPS and
PRN 17 of Galileo) in a short period, from 37 s to 44 s. The subset positions in both
cases, with and without pseudorange fault, are calculated and compared at a single
epoch (40s) to study the effect of such fault on measurement consistency. The C/N0
ratios for the satellites are 39.7 dB-Hz and 40.1 dB-Hz, respectively. In figure 4.3
and 4.4 are reported all the possible estimated positions considering all the possible
subsets of satellites (for both the cases of bias and bias free measurements). On the
figures, the plus marker represents the true position (which is known thanks to the
simulation process), the diamond marker represents the all-in-view solution, while
the dots are the subset positions, the star marker is the final output position (after
exclusion once the faults are detected), and the large circle depicts the HPL. It is
1The real data collections used to test and validate the proposed algorithm were kindly provided
by Gianluca Marucco, Micaela Troglia Gamba (Istituto Superiore Mario Boella (ISMB), Italy),
and Hong Lam Nguyen (Politecnico di Torino).
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Figure 4.3: Subset positions in case of no fault
observed that for the clean data, in Figure 4.3, the subset positions are relatively
consistent to the all-in-view one, deviated around 5 meters around the true position.
In this case, the final position is the all-in-view position, since no fault is detected
and exclusion is not necessary. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4.4, the
faulty measurement shows lower consistency, where the subset positions deviate
more than 50 meters from the all-in-view solution and far away from the true
position, obviously. If the exclusion mechanism is not applied, the output (which is
the all-in-view position) can deviate about 50 m away from the true position. The
final position after FDE is less than 10 m away from the true position. It’s worth
mentioning that the HPL on both plots also cover the true position, satisfying the
definition mentioned at the beginning of the paper.
On the other hand, it can be observed that the HPL in case of fault is slightly
higher than in the clean case. This is because the two faulty satellites have been
successfully detected and excluded, thus mitigating the potential error but also
81
4 – Kalman filter-based ARAIM for urban environment
Figure 4.4: Subset positions in case of two faults injected
inevitably degrading the overall satellite geometry.
Fault detection and exclusion
Similar to the analysis of the subset positions, a random ranging fault was
injected to 2 satellites: PRN 26 of GPS and PRN 2 of Galileo for a short period.
The ranging fault is normal distributed with mean of 200 m and standard deviation
of 10 m. The fault persisted for 8 s, from 37 s to 44 s.
Table 4.1: Values for Probabilities of False Alarm
Parameter Value
PFA 6.65× 10−5
PFA_HOR 6.317× 10−5
PFA_V ERT 3.325× 10−6
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The SS tests were executed on the whole simulated data. For the coefficients
defined in (4.16) and (4.17), the values for Probabilities of False Alarm are provided
in Table 4.1, which is the same order of magnitude to the value used in [109]. On
the other hand, the measurement noise covariance matrix follows the model in
[70], using the Lightly degraded environment parameters as suggested in previous
experiment.
The proposed method successfully detected and excluded the faulty satellite
throughout the fault occurrence. The positioning results in both cases - without and
with fault exclusion - are reported in Figure 4.5. Note that the faulty positioning
results are indicated, and deviate about 30 m from the true positions. With fault
exclusion, the route remained smooth and correct.
Figure 4.5: Positioning results with fault exclusion
Protection Levels
After all the Solution Separation tests are passed, the algorithm should proceed
with the Protection Levels calculation. In this simulation, the integrity budget is
allocated as in Table 3.2. Recall that the risk budget is allocated much higher in
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horizontal direction rather than vertical direction, as navigation in urban traffic
usually relies more on horizontal direction. Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show the HPL
and the Horizontal Positioning Error (HPE) for both LS-based ARAIM and the
proposed KF-based ARAIM, respectively. Two segments are highlighted on both
figures. The first features the manually injected faults on two satellites as described
in Section 4.4.1, which persisted from 37 s to 44 s. The second highlighted period
corresponds to the multipath-affected period as introduced in Section 3.4.2.
Figure 4.6: Protection Levels and Positioning Error for LS-based ARAIM
Observing figure 4.6, the HPL of the LS-based ARAIM is about 6 m for most
of the simulation duration. During the manual fault period (the first highlighted
period), the algorithm successfully detected and excluded the faulty satellites, hence
the lower number of satellites and increases the HPL. However, the HPL remains the
same during the multipath period. This is due to the noise model of the algorithm
relies solely on the elevation angles of the satellites, which remain mostly the same
throughout the simulation period.
In contrast, the KF-ARAIM method’s HPL in Figure 4.7 shows some drastic
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Figure 4.7: Protection Levels and Positioning Error for KF-based ARAIM
changes. During the clean period, the HPL is around 10 m. This is higher than
the HPL evaluated by the LS-based ARAIM, which is mainly contributed by the
different noise models. As shown in Section 3.4.3, the Kuusniemi’s model (which is
integrated in the proposed algorithm) yields a higher value (more than double) for
the standard deviation than the original ARAIM error model. While this might look
like an advantage for the original ARAIM algorithm, it is important to note that the
clean segment of the data is simply for comparison and testing purpose, and does
not realistically reflect a real-life signal in urban scenario - hence the necessity of
the multipath-affected signal. In the manual fault period (first highlighted period),
similar to the LS-based ARAIM, the algorithm successfully detected and excluded
the faulty satellites, thus reducing the number of satellites. This reduces the quality
of the overall satellite geometry, thus increased the HPL. During the multipath
period, the HPL increases up to about 14 m due to the decrease of C/N0 becaused
of the multipath presence. This observation confirms the analysis in Section 4.3
about the effect of multipath on evaluated PL using the proposed method.
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4.4.2 Real data collection
Figure 4.8: Real data collection route
Besides the simulation data, the performance analysis also utilizes real data sets
collected in the streets of Turin, Italy on a car. The GNSS signals are collected
using an ANTCOM antenna, mounted on the roof of the car, connected to the NSL
STEREO Frontend [95] and saved to file using a grabber running on a laptop. The
reference track was acquired simultaneously by a NovAtel receiver with an Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) [115], using the same signals splitting from the mounted
antenna.
The route of the data collection is depicted in Figure 4.8 as the red line. The
collection is about 800 seconds long. The beginning of the route is a test run in
a large courtyard in the main campus of Politecnico di Torino, with low building
nearby. For the remaining duration, the car moved along normal streets, Corso
Francesco Ferucci, with trees and apartment building on both side of the road.
Some photos showing the environment are presented also in Figure 4.8. The data
set consists of 5 GPS satellites and 2 Galileo satellites throughout the period. The
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Figure 4.9: Skyplot of the real data set
skyplot of the data set is shown in Figure 4.9.
4.4.3 Results on real data
Figure 4.10: Positioning results of the real data collection
The real data set was processed using the proposed KF-based ARAIM algo-
rithm, and the output positioning results are compared with the reference track
obtained from the Novatel receiver introduced in Section 4.4.2. The positioning
results are plotted in Figure 4.10 as yellow squares. Several segments of interest
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Figure 4.11: HPL of the real data collection evaluated by KF-based ARAIM and
LS-based ARAIM
are also highlighted. The route starts with a test run in a large courtyard with low
building nearby - marked as segment A. Segment B sees the car run in a 6-lane
street with trees and apartment buildings on both sides of the street. The car stops
at segment C for about 100 seconds, due to traffic light. For the remaining segment
D, the car continues to move along the 6-lane street. The HPL for the whole period
is depicted in Figure 4.11, also highlighting the corresponding zones of interest.
The positioning results for segment A are shown in Figure 4.12, where the
calculated positions are the yellow squares, the red line is the reference track. It
can be observed that the estimated positions are very close to the reference track
(less than 2 m). The HPL for this period, as reported in Figure 4.11, is about
25-26m and very smooth thanks to the open sky and low buildings. Segment
B’s positioning results are depicted in Figure 4.13, which shows similar quality to
Segment A as the results are also very close to the reference track. There are some
perturbation probably due to the multipath from high buildings on both sides of the
street. The HPL of this segment is also higher and noisier, up to 28 m, confirming
the degradation of the signal quality in this part of the route.
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Figure 4.12: Positioning results of segment A
Figure 4.13: Positioning results of segment B
At the stop at segment C, the HPL is lower (around 26 m) since the car stops
next to a park, thus less multipath is visible as in segment B. Following up, the
positioning results of segment D are shown in Figure 4.14, which consists of a large
crossing (marked E) and a roundabout (marked F) besides the normal street similar
to segment B. It can be observed in Figure 4.15, which zoomed in on Segment D,
that the HPL lowers when the car passes through these points, while remains higher
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Figure 4.14: Positioning results of segment D
and noisy in other parts, similar to segment B.
Figure 4.15: HPL of the real data collection for segment D (zoomed in)
For comparison, the same processing was done using the conventional LS-based
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ARAIM and the HPL is reported also in Figure 4.11. Unlike KF-ARAIM, the HPL
evaluated by LS-ARAIM is very smooth and ranges from 26 to 28 m for the most
part (which is similar to KF-ARAIM). However, there are some exclusion occurred
at the beginning and near the end of the period, which excessively increased the
HPL, due to degraded geometry in a situation where the number of satellites is
already low. Note that for KF-ARAIM, no satellite was excluded during the whole
operation.
Overall, the HPL of over 25 m should be sufficient to protect the user from in-
tegrity risk. More importantly, the HPL calculated by the proposed algorithm can
follow the change in the measurement quality as the car moves through different
surrounding. The number of satellites is also maintained throughout the dura-
tion, which is also important due to the low visibility of the urban environment.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed algorithm is suitable for integrity
monitoring in urban scenario.
4.4.4 Computation time
The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm depends heavily on
the number of visible satellites Nsat, considering the SS approach needs to evaluate
all the subset solutions. Assuming the maximum number of concurrent faulty
satellites (calculated in Step 2 of the algorithm) to be 2, the total number of subsets
(including the all-in-view set) can be expressed as:
⎛⎝ Nsat
1
⎞⎠+
⎛⎝ Nsat
2
⎞⎠+ 1 = Nsat + Nsat (Nsat − 1)2 + 1 (4.27)
Under the presence of faulty satellites, the algorithm would attempt the exclu-
sion process, which essentially repeats the SS tests on reduced (candidate) sets of
satellites.
The computation time of the proposed KF-based ARAIM algorithm is mea-
sured on a MATLAB implementation of the algorithm, deployed on a laptop PC
with Intel® Core™i7-4710HQ CPU @ 2.50GHZ and 16GB DDR3 RAM. It is also
compared with the LS-based counterpart. The results are depicted in Figure 4.16
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Figure 4.16: Computation time of both algorithm
for the simulated data set, and in Figure 4.17 for the real data set. The implemen-
tation for both algorithm has been optimized in term of design, memory allocation
and programming technique, to ensure fair comparison.
It can be observed on Figure 4.16 that the execution time of the proposed
KF-based ARAIM is almost identical to the LS counterpart, and noticeably lower
during the manual fault period. This is due to the different noise model between the
two algorithm. The noise level of the Kuusniemi’s model allows higher tolerance to
solution separation in the KF-based ARAIM, resulting in less number of candidate
for the exclusion step than the case of the LS-based algorithm. As a result, the
LS-based ARAIM takes more time to go through all the candidate before choosing
the correct faulty satellites to exclude.
The same observation can be made on Figure 4.17 for the real data case. While
the execution time for both algorithm is nearly identical for most of the experiment
period, there are several periods of false exclusions for the LS-based algorithm, as
already shown in Figure 4.11. For these period, the execution time is noticeably
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Figure 4.17: Computation time of both algorithm
higher, since the algorithm has to process also the exclusion candidates. The pro-
posed KF-based ARAIM, however, does not (falsely) detect faulty satellites during
these period, thus maintain the same execution time thoroughly.
It is important to note that, the execution time reported here is measured on a
MATLAB implementation, thus does not reflect actual runtime of the algorithms in
real-time implementations. This experiment only compares the computation time
relatively between the proposed algorithm and the closely-related LS-based ARAIM
algorithm. Further real-time comparison will be in the scope of future work.
4.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, a KF-based ARAIM algorithm was proposed, following the SS
approach as an integrity monitoring method for urban environment. The method is
an adaptation of ARAIM algorithm from LS to KF, also adopting the noise model
based on C/N0 [70]. The method was implemented in MATLAB and tested on
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simulation data, which simulates the multipath effect that’s often encountered in
urban scenario. The results confirms the validity of the method, good consistency
under the effect of multipath. The resulting Protection Level responses well to the
change of the signal quality, and thus can protect the users from environmental-
based degradation. Further validation was done using real data collection, obtained
in the urban area of Turin, Italy. The results also show that the Protection Level
can follow the change of measurement quality as the vehicle goes through different
area, while maintaining integrity and availability.
On the other hand, the proposed algorithm was also compared with conventional
LS-based ARAIM in both simulation and real data validation. Comparative results
show that the proposed algorithm is a more suitable method for urban scenario in
term of integrity and availability, especially in the real data validation. While the
LS-based ARAIM attempted unnecessary exclusion in several points (leading to
excessive PL and potential loss of availability), the porposed KF-based ARAIM
maintained the number of satellites thus ensuring the availability during the whole
period.
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Integrity is the concept about the level of trust an user can put into the naviga-
tion result of a positioning system. It has been an important factor in evaluating
the performance of navigation systems in the field of civil aviation. Beyond that,
the necessity of highly reliable navigation performance in other types of application
calls for the adaptation of the integrity concept and the related integrity monitoring
techniques to contexts other than civil aviation. This thesis has explored the possi-
bility of adapting the ARAIM algorithm - a new generation of integrity monitoring
method originally developed to satisfy the stringent requirement of the LPV-200
procedure - into urban scenario. In fact, the adaptation process has to take into
account all the notable difference between the condition of airports area (where the
ARAIM algorithm usually operates) and the aiming urban scenario.
Chapter 3 focuses on outlining the necessary changes, as well as finding the
solution for the adaptation problem. From an in-depth study of the original ARAIM
algorithm, it is necessary to change the integrity and continuity risk requirements,
as well as removing the negligible nominal bias. Both of these changes are largely
due to the potential lower requirement of urban application with respect to the
initial aviation procedure. The third point to change is also the most important,
which is the necessity for a reliable noise model. Considering the unpredictable
nature of multipath in urban environment, it is important for the noise model to
be able to follow and adapt to the sudden change of the signal and measurement
quality. Comparative study on several noise models using simulated signal has
led to the choice of the C/N0-based noise model [70], which is very responsive to
the change of signal quality. It is also worth mentioning that, a MATLAB-based
signal generator has been developed for the experiments in this thesis, which can
specifically simulates signal affected by multipath effect prominently encountered
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in urban areas. Using the standardized multipath model LMMC [76], the signal
generator can be considered a reliable testing tool for urban-related experiments.
From the results of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 proposes the KF-based ARAIM algo-
rithm, which adapts the original LS-based ARAIM onto a KF model, along with
the C/N0-based noise model. Experiments using simulated data, which resembles
the multipath effects usually present in urban areas, validates the proposed method.
The method shows good consistency, availability and responsiveness in the presence
of multipath. The computed PL also reflects the changes of signal quality through-
out the simulation period, while maintaining integrity and availability. The same
observation can be made when experimenting with a real data set collected in the
streets of Turin, Italy. The HPL fully reflects the changes of environment and
measurement quality when the vehicle pass through different areas.
The proposed algorithm is also compared with the conventional ARAIM with
its original aviation settings in both simulation and real data validation. The
comparisons clearly show the better suitability of the proposed method for integrity
monitoring in urban context, especially in the real data experiment. While the
conventional LS-based ARAIM unnecessary exclusion in several points (leading to
excessive PL and undesired loss of availability), the proposed algorithm maintained
the number of satellites and ensuring the availability during the whole period.
For future work, it is possible to further improve the proposed KF-based ARAIM
in several ways:
• A different method to find a consistent set of satellites can be considered
for the exclusion step. Currently, the method employs an exhaustive search,
going through all found candidates and stops when a consistent set is found,
prioritizing exclusion lowest number of satellites as possible. It is possible to
follow other approaches, such as to search in a heuristic way using the SS
test results, since such results are usually higher when the correct satellites
are excluded. This will reduce the number of candidates to process, and thus
improve the computation time.
• The noise model can be modified in an adaptive way, instead of fixing the pa-
rameters values as the current setup. This will allows even better adaptation
to the changing environment as the vehicle moves around.
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• The algorithm can be extended to accommodate external sensors for the po-
sitioning procedure, such as inertial sensors. In this case, the PL equations
and the SS tests should be extended to take into account the potential faults
of the sensors as well, with corresponding integrity and continuity risks to be
allocated accordingly.
On the other hand, real time implementation and testing of the algorithm can be
considered in parallel with the aforementioned improvement. An option would be
deploying the algorithm into GNSS software receivers running on PC or specialized
hardware. Under such circumstances, further designing maybe necessary to port
the algorithm to the desired hardware system.
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Appendix A
Covariance of fault correction
from all-in-view position
For discrete Kalman filter, it has been defined:
ek = xk − xˆ(0)k (A.1)
where xk is the true state vector, xˆ(0)k is the all-in-view estimated state vector
ek is assumed to have zero mean and covariance P (0)k .
From this, we can write for each fault hypothesis q:
∆xˆ(q)k = xˆ
(q)
k − xˆ(0)k
= (xk − xˆ(0)k )− (xk − xˆ(q)k ) = ek − e(q)k (A.2)
Thus, the covariance matrix of ∆xˆ(q)k can be defined as:
P
(q)
∆xˆk = P
(q)
k + P
(0)
k − 2cov(ek, e(q)k ) (A.3)
While P (0)k and P
(q)
k can be calculated using (1.15) and (4.4), respectively, the
covariance between ek and e(q)k can be expressed as:
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cov(ek, e(q)k ) = E
[
eke
(q)T
k
]
= E
{
(xk − xˆk)
(
xk − xˆ(q)k
)T}
= E
{[(
xk − xˆ−k
)
−Kk
(
zk −Hkxˆ−k
)]
(A.4)[(
xk − xˆ−k
)
−K(q)
(
zk −Hkxˆ−k
)]T}
Expanding (A.4), note that ek and e(q)k has zero mean, (A.4) becomes:
cov(ek, e(q)k ) = (I −KkHk)P−k (I −K(q)k Hk)T (A.5)
+KkRkK(q)Tk
Replacing (A.5) into (A.3), P (q)∆xˆk can be written as:
P
(q)
∆xˆk = P
(q)
k + P
(0)
k (A.6)
− 2
(
(I −KkHk)P−k (I −K(q)k Hk)T +KkRkK(q)Tk
)
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Protection Level equation
The derivation for the Protection Level (PL) equation follows a similar approach
to one described in [134] and [60], considering the KF model. In [60], the integrity
risk is defined to cover both fault detection and fault exclusion.
For fault detection, the event of integrity risk occurrence can be defined when
there is a large error (larger than the PL) but no fault was detected. For each fault
hypothesis q, the integrity risk for the s-coordinate is defined as a joint probability:
P
(
|ek,s| > PL,
⏐⏐⏐∆x(q)k,s⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)k,s ) (B.1)
where ek,s = xk − xˆ(0)k is the true error of xˆ(0)k .
For simplicity, the derivation in this section will omit the notation of k, since all
the Kalman filter-related vectors and matrices are all correspond to discrete time
tk. That said, (B.1) can be rewritten as:
P
(
|es| > PL,
⏐⏐⏐∆x(q)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)s ) (B.2)
Defining e− = x − xˆ− as the error of the apriori state estimation xˆ−, the
difference between the updated and true state vector can be expressed as:
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xˆ(q) − x = xˆ− − x+K(q)(z −Hxˆ−)
= xˆ− − x+K(q)(Hx+ v −Hxˆ−)
= (K(q)H − I)e− +K(q)v
= S(q)e− +K(q)v (B.3)
where
S(q) =K(q)H − I
S(0) =KH − I (B.4)
In case of fault, the satellite faults can be modeled as a fault vector bfault ∈
R2Nsat which only affect certain satellites, can be incorporated into the measurement
error vector as:
vfault = v + bfault (B.5)
where v is the nominal measurement error vector, vfault is the measurement
error vector in case of fault. Assume that bfault only affect satellites in fault hy-
pothesis q, so that:
W (q)bfault = 0 (B.6)
W (h)bfault /= 0 ∀h /= q (B.7)
(B.8)
With that assumption, the fault affects the all-in-view state as follows:
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xˆ(0) − x = S(q)e− +K(0)vfault (B.9)
= S(q)e− +K(0)v +K(0)bfault
xˆ(q) − x = S(q)e− +K(q)vfault (B.10)
= S(q)e− +K(q)v
From (B.1) we have:
P
(
|ek,s| > PL,
⏐⏐⏐∆x(q)k,s⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)k,s )
= P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(0)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xˆ(0)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)s )
= P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(0)s − xˆ(q)s + xˆ(q)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xˆ(0)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)s )
≤ P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(0)s − xˆ(q)s ⏐⏐⏐+ ⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xˆ(0)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)s )
≤ P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL− T (q)s , ⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xˆ(0)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (q)s )
≤ P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(q)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL− T (q)s )
= Q
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
(B.11)
where Q(·) is the complement of the Gaussian cumulative distribution function,
with zero mean and unit variance, and σ(q)s is defined as:
σ(q)2s =
[
S(q)P−S(q)T +K(q)RK(q)T
]
s,s
=
[
P
(q)
alt
]
s,s
(B.12)
Let p(q)fault be the fault probability for fault hypothesis q, the boundary for the
integrity risk in case of detection can be written as:
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PHMI,D =
Nfault∑
q=0
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
= p(0)faultQ
(
PL
σ
(0)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
≤ Q
(
PL
σ
(0)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
(B.13)
The first term of (B.13) represents the event of no detection under fault-free
condition, while the second terms represents the missed detection when subset q is
faulty.
In case of exclusion, the event of integrity risk occurrence can be defined when
there is a large error (larger than the PL), a fault is detected and an exclusion
candidate j is actually excluded. Note that for a subset j to be excluded, all fault
hypothesis q on the remaining satellite set must pass the solution separation test.
For each exclusion candidate j and each fault hypothesis q, the integrity risk for
exclusion along the s-coordinate is defined as:
P
(⏐⏐⏐e(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐∆x(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ > T (j)s , ⏐⏐⏐∆x(j,q)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (j,q)s ) (B.14)
where ∆x(j,q)s = x(j,q)s −x(j)s is the solution separation for fault hypothesis q after
excluding candidate j, i.e. considering the remaining satellites as all in view; e(j)s
is the positioning error after having removed subset j; T (j,q)s is the test threshold
for the corresponding solution separation. Notice that subset j is detected to be a
fault due to
⏐⏐⏐∆x(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ > T (j)s , then is removed because ⏐⏐⏐∆x(j,q)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (j,q)s . Following
similar derivation as for detection case, (B.14) can be written as:
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P
(⏐⏐⏐e(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐∆x(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ > T (j)s , ⏐⏐⏐∆x(j,q)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (j,q)s )
≤ P
(⏐⏐⏐e(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐∆x(j,q)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (j,q)s )
= P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(j)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL, ⏐⏐⏐xˆ(j,q)s − x(j)s ⏐⏐⏐ < T (j,q)s )
≤ P
(⏐⏐⏐xˆ(j,q)s − xs⏐⏐⏐ > PL− T (j,q)s )
= Q
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
(B.15)
Considering all exclusion hypothesis j and all fault hypothesis q, the integrity
risk in case of exclusion can be expressed as:
PHMI,E =
Nfault∑
q=0
Nfault∑
j=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
= p(0)fault
Nfault∑
j=1
Q
(
PL
σ
(j)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
Nfault∑
j=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
= p(0)fault
Nfault∑
j=1
Q
(
PL
σ
(j)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL
σ
(q)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
Nfault∑
j=1
j /=q
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
≤
Nfault∑
j=1
Q
(
PL
σ
(j)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL
σ
(q)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
Nfault∑
j=1
j /=q
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
(B.16)
The first term in the last line of (B.16) represents wrong exclusion of subset j
under fault free condition. The second term represents the case where j = q, q > 0
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which is the correct exclusion case. Note that with j = q, subset (j, q) simplifies to
(q) since they are the same subset. The third term represents the wrong exclusion
case with j /= q, i.e. excluding subset j while the fault is in fact in subset q.
From (B.13) and (B.16), the PL equation for both detection and exclusion can
be formally expressed as:
PHMI = PHMI,D + PHMI,E
= Q
(
PL
σ
(0)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
j=1
Q
(
PL
σ
(j)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL
σ
(q)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
Nfault∑
j=1
j /=q
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
(B.17)
(B.17) is the formal equation to evaluate the PL, which takes into account the
integrity risks from both detection and exclusion. However, this form should be
considered as a predictive form to calculate PL before either the events of detection
and exclusion occurs. In implementation, only certain terms of the equation should
be used in certain cases, to avoid suboptimal allocation of the integrity risk and
thus ensure sufficient availability. Therefore, in case of simple detection without
exclusion implementation, the practical equation should eliminate the exclusion
terms (since there are no exclusion candidate to be considered):
PHMI,0 = Q
(
PL
σ
(0)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
(B.18)
In case of fault detection and exclusion of a subset j, the missed detection
terms (the first two terms) of (B.17) should be eliminated since at least a fault was
detected on subset j, and the exclusion terms should only consider the excluded
subset j:
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PHMI,j = Q
(
PL
σ
(j)
s
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL
σ
(q)
s
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (j,q)s
σ
(j,q)
s
)
(B.19)
Equation (B.17) and the other forms of (B.18), (B.19) are the generalized equa-
tions for PL along the direction of s coordinate. From this, the specific equation
for VPL and HPL can be defined for each case accordingly. In case of no detection,
the equation for VPL can be written as:
PHMI,V ERT,0 = Q
(
V PL
σ
(0)
3
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝V PL− T (q)3
σ
(q)
3
⎞⎠ (B.20)
The equations for HPL can be defined as:
1
2PHMI,HOR,0 = Q
(
HPL1
σ
(0)
1
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPL1 − T (q)1
σ
(q)
1
⎞⎠ (B.21)
1
2PHMI,HOR,0 = Q
(
HPL2
σ
(0)
2
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPL2 − T (q)2
σ
(q)
2
⎞⎠ (B.22)
HPL =
√
HPL21 +HPL22 (B.23)
In case of exclusion, the equation for VPL can be defined as:
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PHMI,V ERT,j = Q
(
V PL
σ
(j)
3
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
V PL
σ
(q)
3
)
(B.24)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝V PL− T (j,q)3
σ
(j,q)
3
⎞⎠
Similarly, the equations for HPL can be defined as:
1
2PHMI,HOR,j = Q
(
HPL1
σ
(j)
1
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
HPL1
σ
(q)
1
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPL1 − T (j,q)1
σ
(j,q)
1
⎞⎠ (B.25)
1
2PHMI,HOR,j = Q
(
HPL2
σ
(j)
2
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
HPL2
σ
(q)
2
)
+
Nfault,j∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
⎛⎝HPL2 − T (j,q)2
σ
(j,q)
2
⎞⎠ (B.26)
HPL =
√
HPL21 +HPL22 (B.27)
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Solution method for the PL
equation
Let Pex(PL) represents the right side of (B.18):
Pex(PL) = Q
(
PL
σ
(0)
s
)
+
Nfault∑
q=1
p
(q)
faultQ
(
PL− T (q)s
σ
(q)
s
)
(C.1)
Let PHMI,s be the integrity risk PHMI allocated to the s-coordinate. Thus, the
PL equation becomes
Pex(PL) = PHMI,s (C.2)
Denote PLsol as the solution of (C.2). While it is not trivial to solve (C.2)
analytically, in this work, the equation is solved by linear approximation. The
starting point is to find initial PL such that:
PLup,init > PLtrue
PLlow,init < PLtrue (C.3)
For Multi-Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS) RAIM [101], the PL is cal-
culated as:
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PLsol = max
q
{PLq} (C.4)
where PLq is the PL imposed by fault hypotheses q (each corresponds to a
fault hypothesis q). In fact, while PLq can be computed by optimally allocating
PHMI,s to each fault hypothesis [17], denoted P (q)HMI,s. Interested reader can refer
to [101, 17] for this approach. In this work, (C.4) was exploited to calculate the
initial PLlow,init and PLup,init using different allocation of PHMI,s. Note that Q(·)
is a monotonically decreasing function, thus overly allocated P (q)HMI,s will yield PLq
lower than PLtrue, such as putting whole integrity budget for each fault hypothesis:
PLlow,init = max
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Q−1
(
PHMI,s
2 σ
(0)
k,s
)
,
maxqQ−1
(
PHMI,s
p
(q)
fault
σ
(q)
k,s + T
(q)
k,s
)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ (C.5)
In contrast, suboptimal P (q)HMI,s will produce PLq larger than PLtrue, such as
evenly allocate the integrity budget to all fault hypothesis plus all-in-view:
PLup,init = max
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Q−1
(
PHMI,s
2(Nfault+1)σ
(0)
k,s
)
,
maxqQ−1
(
PHMI,s
p
(q)
fault(Nfault+1)
σ
(q)
k,s + T
(q)
k,s
)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ (C.6)
By using linear interpolation on Pex(PL) between PLup,init and PLlow,init, the
result is an approximation of PLsol. Since Pex(PL) is convex and monotonically
decreasing, this approximation can be considered a upper bound for PLsol:
PLapprox,up = PLlow,init + (PHMI,s − Pex (PLlow,init))
× PLup,init − PLlow,init
Pex (PLup,init)− Pex (PLlow,init) (C.7)
Similarly, linear interpolation can be done on log (Pex(PL)) to obtain a lower
bound for PLsol, since log (Pex(PL)) is concave:
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PLapprox,low = PLlow,init
+ (log (PHMI,s)− log (Pex (PLlow,init)))
× PLup,init − PLlow,initlog (Pex (PLup,init))− log (Pex (PLlow,init)) (C.8)
Then, PLsol can be approximate as the median of PLapprox,low and PLapprox,up,
or one more iteration of linear interpolation can be execute between PLapprox,low
and PLapprox,up should more accurate approximation be desired.
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